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NOTES
EQUITY POWER OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS OVER CLASSIFICATION
AND ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS*
Tn. expanding equitable powers of bankruptcy courts loom as an encour-
aging safeguard to creditors and investors in proceedings under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The difficulties of drafting legislation comprehensive enough to
encompass the diverse problems encountered in distributing the assets of
and the control over debtors' estates have become increasingly apparent. By
emphasizing equity power, the Supreme Court has provided a means of
filling in gaps in the Act and of supplementing the technical confines of statu-
tory provisions.'
A significant step in extending the equitable functions of bankruptcy courts
was taken by the Court in a recent case2 involving a municipal composition
under Chapter IX of the Chandler Act.3 Unable to service or meet maturity
dates on its indebtedness, the City of Avon Park, Florida, contracted for the
services of R. E. Crummer & Co. as its fiscal agent in a proposed refunding
plan.4 The contract provided for compensation to Crummer by a four per
cent assessment against participating bondholders, subject to a reduction to
two per cent if bondholders sold accrued interest coupons to the fiscal agent
* American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 61 Sup. Ct. 157 (U. S. 1940).
1. See especially Securities & Exch. Comm. v. United States Realty & Imp. Co., 310
U. S. 434 (1940) ; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Elect. Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939). For an example of judicial clarification of ambiguous
statutory provision see Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939),
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1099.
2. American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 61 Sup. Ct. 157 (U. S.
1940).
3. 50 STAT. 653 (1937), as amended 52 STAT. 939 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 401-404
(Supp. 1939). Legislation providing for municipal debt readjustments was first enacted
in 1934 as a two-year emergency amendment to the National Bankruptcy Act. 48 STAT.
798 (1934). Prior to its expiration date, this portion of the Act was declared unconsti-
tutional. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Imp. Dist., 298 U. S. 513 (1936). The
amendment was again enacted, with minor changes, in 1937. 50 STAT. 653 (1937). Its
constitutionality has since been sustained. United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27 (1938).
The present expiration date of the amendment is June 30, 1942.
4. The fiscal agency device has achieved widespread use in dealing with the prob-
lems of defaulting local taxing units. This method has the advantage of effecting debt
adjustments without the lengthy periods of negotiation formerly encountered. But un-
controlled use of the device has permitted fiscal agents to engage in speculative activities
and may occasionally have resulted in adjusting debts of local taxing units where relief
was not actually necessary. For an insight into both the advantages and dangers in the
activities of fiscal agents, see Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 8016,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). The dangers have been aggravated by the tendency of the
courts to place primary emphasis upon the presence of the required statutory assents as
indicating the fairness of a proposed plan. Vallette v. Vero Beach, 104 F. (2d) 59 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 586 (1939).
892
NOTES
at one-third their face value.5 Crummer itself held approximately 34 per cent
of the claims against the city, some having been acquired after the fiscal
agency contract at half the face value. The proposed refunding plan was filed
in a district court after 69 per cent of the bondholders, including the fiscal
agent, had assented to the exchange." In securing assents, apparently neither
the city nor Crummer disclosed the latter's true interest in the composition.
Both the district court and the circuit court of appeals approved the plan
as conforming to statutory requirenents7 and the charge of four per cent as
a reasonable one. No affirmative finding was made, however, as to Crummer's
speculative interest either in the accrued interest coupons or in the bonds
acquired at default prices.
The Supreme Court set aside the order of confirmation, holding unanimously
that, in the absence of an affirmative finding that Crummer's interest in the
composition had been fully disclosed to bondholders, the assents were not
solicited and obtained in good faith within the meaning of the statute.8
Asserting that full disclosure is only a minimum requirement, the Court em-
phasized that the responsibility of bankruptcy courts entails scrutiny of
motives inducing acceptances, the time when claims were acquired, and the
amounts paid for them. 9 Furthermore, where investigation discloses inequit-
able conduct or treatment, the Court indicated that equitable remedies-
complete subordination of some claims,' 0 separate classification of claimants,
and limitation of voting power to the amount paid for claims - may be
utilized to effect a just distribution of assets or control.
Equitable classification of claimants for voting purposes is an important
adjunct to the statutory powers of bankruptcy courts under Chapter IX.
Designed to avoid difficulty and inequity resulting from the common law
"race of diligence" after defaults of local taxing units," proceedings under
5. The original contract made surrender of the accrued interest coupons to Crum-
mer at one-third of face value a prerequisite to participation. See American United
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park 61 Sup. Ct. 157, 160, n. 3 (U. S. 1940).
6. The statute requires acceptance by holders of two-thirds of the aggregate amount
of claims. BANKRuPTcY Act §83(d), 50 STAT. 657 (1937), 11 U. S. C. §403(d) (Supp.
1939). The Act will hereafter be cited only by section number except where reference
is made to entire chapters.
7. § 83(e).
8. § 83(e) (5).
9. Cf. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939); National
Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426 (1933) ; see Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil
Refg Co., 89 F. (2d) 333, 337 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
10. The equitable power of bankruptcy courts to subordinate claims in cases of fraud
or mismanagement has previously been indicated by the Supreme Court. Pepper v. Lit-
ton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939) ; Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elect. Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939).
See Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 881.
11. Creditors of local taxing units experienced great difficulty in obtaining satis-
factory settlement of claims prior to the enactment of the municipal debt-readjustment
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. See Dession, Municipal Debt Adjustment and the
Supreme Court (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 199, 200-213; Comment (1934) 43 Ymx L J.
924, 962-78; SEC REPoRT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATI N OF THE WORE, AcriviTiFs,
PERSONNEL, AN FuNcTIoNs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION Co.UrT.EES, Pt. IV
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Chapter IX are essentially compositions in which the rule that "equality is
equity" among creditors prevails. The statute provides for separate classi-
fication of claimants only where claims are payable from different sources.
12
All claims in the principal case were payable from the general taxing power
of the municipality and thus would be grouped as a single class for voting
purposes.13 The Supreme Court recognized, however, that voting in a single
class may be inequitable where one creditor's vote is motivated by an induce-
ment peculiar to him and not shared by other creditors in the class. Hence,
an affirmative finding that profits under the plan would accrue to Crummer
on the interest coupons but not to other creditors would constitute sufficient
discrimination to authorize separate classification for voting purposes regard-
less of the limitation of the statute. Such a view accords with that reached
under a somewhat comparable English statute. There the required statutory
vote had been obtained but the English court refused confirmation of the
proposed plan because an unsecured bank creditor whose large claim had been
guaranteed in full by the directors of the debtor had not been separately
classified for voting from other unsecured creditors who had received no
guarantee.14 American commentators have frequently argued that such a
view would not obtain under applicable bankruptcy statutes in this country
because the only classification contemplated would be on a basis of economic
status arising out of past dealing with the debtor. But in the principal case
the Court appears to have rejected this narrow view of classification. By
concluding that a judge must inquire into the motives of those obtaining
(1936) 46-60. [Hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT.] Doubt has been expressed as to
whether Chapter IX provides sufficient controls to meet former difficulties. Desslon,
supra 46 YALE L. J., at 215-17; Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 974; Dimock and
Frye, Book Review (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 186, 189-90. Need for additional legislation
has been suggested providing for greater judicial control over the entire proceedings, as
in Chapter X, or for submitting plans to the SEC. See Douglas, The Legal Problems
of Control over Protective Committees for Municipal and Quasi-Municipal Obligations
(1936) 2 LEGAL NoTs ox LocAL GOVERNMENT 81, 87; Hearings before Committee on
the Judiciary on H. R. 8016, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 83, 140-8.
12. Section 83(b) provides that ". . . the judge shall classify the creditors accord-
ing to the nature of their respective claims and interests: Provided, however, That the
holders of all claims, regardless of the manner in which they are evidenced, which are
payable without preference out of funds derived from the same source or sources shall be
of one class."
13. The courts have construed the classification provision to mean that all claims
to be satisfied from the taxing power of the state or municipality are payable from the
same source and may properly be placed in one class. See West Coast Life Ins. Co. v.
Merced Irrig. Dist., 114 F. (2d) 654, 671 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) ; Luehrmann v. Drainage
Dist., 104 F. (2d) 696, 703 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
14. La Laini~re de Roubaix v. Glen Glove & Hosiery Co., [1926] Sess. Cas. 91.
The English court construed the general classification provision of the English Companies
Act to include this type of classification. Cf. Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd,
[1892] 2 Q. B. 573. The Court in the Avon Park case indicated that equitable classifi-
cation is an inherent power of bankruptcy courts existing independent of statutory pro-
vision.
15. See FINLETT=, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION (1939) 466; Friendly,
Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act (1934) 48 HARr. L. REv. 39, 71.
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assents and require separate classification if necessary in order to guarantee
that the vote equitably represents the judgment of the creditors, the Court
recognized that prior economic status is not necessarily a satisfactory measure
of the interests of creditors in a proposed plan.
This view of the Court appears likely to provide an important supplement
to the classification provision of Chapter X,11 which implies that in cor-
porate reorganizations classification'-, is according to the absolute priority
rule of the Boyd case.' 8 As a general rule, claims having the same economic
status are accorded equal treatment and vote as an independent class. 10 But
the exception noted in the principal case would seem to permit further classi-
fication, apart from the provisions of the statute.20 Thus, when it appears that
certain creditors within a class are voting under a special inducement, they
may be separated for voting purposes. In accordance with this vie%,., the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, by way of dictum, expressed doubt in a
77B proceeding 2 ' as to the fairness of a plan which permitted two secured
creditors, who were also stockholders of the debtor, to vote in the same class
with other secured creditors when the plan contemplated permanent injunc-
tion of actions against stockholders for liability on their shares3- It was
indicated that the interest of the shareholder-creditors in obtaining release
from liability was not shared by other members of the same class. The power
to require separate classification for voting in such situations is important
16. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 501-676 (Supp. 1939). The court granted
certiorari in the Avon Park case because it involved important problems ". . . in the
administration of the composition and reorganization provisions of the Act," thus indi-
cating that the import of the decision is not confined to debt adjustments of local taxing
units under Chapter IX. See American United 'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 61
Sup. Ct. 157, 159 (U. S. 1940).
17. Section 197 provides that "for the purposes of the plan and its acceptance, the
judge shall fix the division of creditors and stockholders into classes according to the
nature of their respective claims and stock."
18. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913). Under the doctrine of the
Boyd case, strict adherence to economic priority must be observed. Junior interests can-
not participate in a reorganization, without contribution, unless senior claims are satis-
fied. See SEC REPoRT, Pt. VIII (1940) 142-161. Application of the Boyd case rule to
Chapter X proceedings was forecast in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 303 U. S.
106 (1939). For a discussion of the case see Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products
Company Case and its Implications (1940) 53 I-Lmv. L. REv. 713.
19. See MooRE, BANKRUPTCy MANUAL (1939) 584; 2 GERDEs, ConwRon.Tu RzomA0;m-
ZATIONS (1936) § 1045. Cf. J. P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri P. K R., 85 F. (2d) 351
(C. C. A. 8th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 604 (1936). See Comment (1940) 49 Yux.E
L. J. 881, 882.
20. The Avon Park case states that the equitable power to classify is inherent in
bankruptcy courts, not dependent upon express statutory provision. See American United
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 61 Sup. Ct. 157, 162 (U. S. 1940).
21. Classification under § 77B was substantially the same as that provided in Chap-
ter X.
22. First Nat. Bank of Herkimer v. Poland Union, 109 F. (2d) 54, 55 (C. C. A. 2d,
1940) (cited with approval in the principal case) ; cf. In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum, 105
F. (2d) 22, 26 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refg Corp.,
89 F. (2d) 333, 338 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
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not only because the court may adjust bargaining power within each class
and so prevent discriminatory treatment, but also because the knowledge of
any particular group that it cannot by its voting power prevail over a dis-
criminated minority will increase the latter's power in striving for position
in the reorganized company.
23
It should be noted, furthermore, that the broad tenor of the opinion in
the principal case appears to go further than separate classification for voting
purposes. Equally as important in the reorganizing process is the power to
prevent inequitable treatment arising from strict adherence to economic status.
The Court's reliance in the Avon Park case on the broad equity power of
bankruptcy courts forecasts the possible use of this power to require separate
classification for treatment within a class having the same economic status
if equal treatment would result in inequity.
2 4
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the courts' duty to scrutinize the motives
lying behind the activities of participating claimants and their power to pro-
vide equitable classification have special importance as protective devices in
proceedings under Chapter XI.25 Contemplating a streamlined procedure
for liquidating or extending the claims of unsecured creditors, XI lacks many
of the protective features of X.26 The debtor is left largely in control under
XI,27 and may obtain the required statutory assents to its proposed plan
prior to the filing of a petition, and without judicial supervision of their
solicitation.28 The placing of claims in hands friendly to the debtor and the
use of outside inducements and misrepresentations in obtaining assents are
real dangers to creditors. Judicial scrutiny of motives and interests would
therefore seem necessary before confirmation of a plan.20 Moreover, the
23. If the severed minority adopts obstructionist tactics to gain further advantage
and threatens to block a proposed plan, the judge would seem to have ample power under
Chapter X to disfranchise the claims as not voted in good faith. § 203.
24. Different treatment within a class may result from compromise in the reorganiza-
tion process. In a § 77B proceeding, two unsecured creditors holding a large proportion
of the claims were accused by other unsecured creditors of dominating the debtor. A
compromise was effected by which the two large creditors received less advantageous
treatment, the other creditors withdrawing their accusations. The plan was confirmed.
i re Burns Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). Cf. St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. Champion Shoe Mach. Co., 109 F. (2d) 313 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); Continental Ins.
Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref'g Corp., 89 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). See Comment
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 881, 884.
25. 52 STAT. 905 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 701-799 (Supp. 1939).
26. See Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization:
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334. For a comparison
of the two Chapters in tabular form see (1940) A3 Copp. REORG. AND Amn. BANK. REV.
329.
27. Under Chapter X the trustee prepares a plan before the debtor may propose a
plan or amendments. § 169. Under Chapter XI, the debtor alone may propose a plan
or amendments. §§ 323, 363.
28. § 336(4).
29. The same high standard of surveillance is required of a bankruptcy court whether
the assents are solicited before or after the filing of a petition. See American United
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 61 Sup. Ct. 157, 162 (U. S. 1940).
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debtor apparently may divide creditors into classes under XI before the plan
is presented to the Court.30 Consequently, the possibility of discriminatory
classification to control voting power constitutes an additional hazard to
creditors which a court may be able to offset through its equitable power
to alter classification. 31
A problem intimately connected with classification in reorganizations and
compositions involves the treatment to be accorded claims acquired imme-
diately prior to or during the judicial proceedings. In addition to stressing
the need for scrutinizing motives and interests, the Avon Park case empha-
sized the responsibility of a bankruptcy court to investigate the time when
claims were acquired and the amounts paid for them.32 Where the need arises,
the Court indicated, there is power to limit the vote of such claims to the
amount of consideration paid. The practice of speculators in buying up claims
at default prices and attempting to extort unreasonable profits or to prevent
reorganization by adopting obstructionist tactics in the judicial proceedings
hardly accords with the accepted principles of "fair and equitable" rehabili-
tation.3 3 In addition, the danger that claims might be purchased by persons
friendly to the debtor, thus facilitating the solicitation of the required statu-
tory assents, formerly constituted a hazard to creditors. Both of these dangers
have been obviated by statutory provision in Chapter X permitting the judge
to disfranchise any claims not voted in good faith.34 The problem of debtor-
controlled votes has apparently been met in Chapters IX-5 and XI3 by
making acceptances in good faith a prerequisite to confirmation. But the
absence of provision in IX and XI for handling dissenters who acquire claims
at default prices makes the problem of obstruction and control of proceedings
acute. Hence the weapon of limitation, filling this statutory gap, may be put
to salutary use in facilitating acceptance of a fair plan despite the obstruc-
30. This would seem the logical interpretation inasmuch as the chapter contemplates
classification and the debtor may both propose a plan and submit it to creditors for ac-
ceptance prior to the filing of a petition.
31. Presumably this result could be reached by a broad interpretation of the clas-
sification provision in XI. as well as on equitable grounds. Section 351 provides: "For
the purposes of the arrangement and its acceptance, the court may fix the division of
creditors into classes. . . ." See note 14 supra.
32. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref'g Co., 89 F. (2d) 333, 337 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1937).
33. Courts have regarded such practices with disfavor. See J. S. Farlee & Co. v.
Springfield-So. Main Realty Co., 86 F. (2d) 931, 936 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Chicago, )%. & St. P. Ry., 15 F. (2d) 434, 443 (N. D. Ill. 1926).
34. Under § 203 the judge may exercise his power of disfranchisement regardless
of the time of acquisition of claims, thus meeting the additional problem of the large equity
holder who refuses to accept a plan not retaining him in control.
35. § 83(e) (5). An additional safeguard in Chapter IX permits the judge to exclude
from the vote claims owned or controlled by the petitioner. § 83(d). The Court indi-
cated in the principal case that this might be a ground for excluding the vote of the
Crummer interests. See American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 61 Sup.
Ct 157, 163 (U. S. 1940).
36. § 366(5).
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tionist tactics of opportunistic dissenters." Furthermore, insistence upon
investigation of the time of acquisition of claims and their use in proceedings
under Chapters IX and XI seems highly necessary because assents may be
obtained before the filing of a petition. A disproportionate number of newly
acquired claims among the acceptances may influence judgment against the
fairness of a proposed plan.
In addition to the limitation which the Avon Park case declares may be
placed upon the voting power of assigned claims, Chapter X expressly pro-
vides that in certain circumstances the court shall examine and may limit
claims in amount of participation to the actual consideration paid. One such
situation is where rent claims have been assigned 38 and the other is where
protective committees or their members have acquired claims during or in
contemplation of proceedings.3 9 The courts have construed the clause relating
to landlords' rent claims as being declaratory of existing law, with the result
that claims will not be limited if investigation fails to disclose a breach of
duty in connection with the assignment. 40 In regard to claims acquired by
protective committees or their members, it has been suggested that a like
showing of breach of fiduciary duty is essential to limitation.
41
Since insiders have frequently purchased claims at a fraction of their true
value in order to gain voting control or for personal profit, the provision
relating to committee claims is particularly salutary. Rigid enforcement of
the statute is desirable where committee members, by misrepresentation or
failure to disclose inside information, have purchased claims at default prices
even though the claims were acquired from holders other than those depositing
37. In In re McEwen's Laundry, 90 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937), the court,
on equity grounds, approved limiting the voting privileges of two unsecured creditors in
a § 77B proceeding to the amount of consideration they had paid for claims. It appeared
that the two creditors were also stockholders of the debtor, had each submitted plans of
reorganization, and had each acquired unsecured claims at 15% of face. To permit them
to vote in full on the assigned claims might thus have placed them in a position to block
all plans unless they were retained in control or accorded preferred treatment. Or pre-
sumably they might force liquidation to the detriment of other creditors. But see Texas
Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco Development Co., 87 F. (2d) 395, 399 (C. C. A. 5th,
1937), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 679 (1937). For a discussion of the problem see SEC
REPORT, Pt. VIII (1940) 113-25.
38. § 202. The same provision is contained in Chapter XI. § 353.
39. § 212.
40. Where a corporation had been reorganized under § 77B, which contained a simi-
lar scrutiny clause, a district court refused to limit the amount of a claim where it found
that the assignee had not obtained confidential information from the bankruptcy trustee
or breached any fiduciary duty. Cumberland Corp. v. McLellan Stores Co., 32 F. Supp.
840 (S. D. N. Y. 1940). Where assigned rent claims have been limited, the courts have
rested on grounds other than the scrutiny clause. In re McCrory Stores, 12 F. Supp. 267
(S. D. N. Y. 1935). See FINLETTER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION
(1939) 293.
41. SEC REPOrT, Pt. VIII (1940) 119, n. 139; FINLETrER, THE LAW OF BANK-
RuPTcY REORGANIZATION (1939) 296-7. The author, however, notes the likelihood that
equity principles may be utilized to reduce provable amounts.
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claims with the particular committee.42 Moreover, a policy permitting the
former holder to intervene as equitable owner of the claims might be devel-
oped under Chapter X, measure of participation being the difference between
the value of the claim in the reorganization and the amount actually received
by the former holder from the assignee. This would permit an equitable
distribution of the estate in one proceeding without relegating defrauded
creditors to an independent action against committee members.43 Further-
more, if defrauded creditors could participate, there would be no windfall
to other participating interests in the event the judge exercised his power
to limit the committee's claims.
While the limitation on extent of participation may presumably be invoked
under Chapter X only in the two specified situations, extension of the lim-
itation on equitable grounds to other types of assigned claims may prove
desirable in achieving a just result. The powers of bankruptcy courts might
well include limitation in amount as well as on voting privilege where third
parties have dominated committees and prevented other bidders from acquir-
ing deposited claims,"4 where parent corporations have acquired claims against
debtor subsidiaries by misrepresentations, 4 5 or where persons connected with
the debtor have acquired claims under questionable circumstances in a reor-
ganization.46 Such a power of limitation upon extent of participation, by
threatening to jeopardize the financial gain to be derived from such dealing,
would have the advantage of serving as a deterrent to inequitable speculative
activities.
47
42. Argument can be made that such a restriction would tend to interfere with ordi-
nary bargaining processes in a reorganization. Committees often buy claims from out-
side holders in order to promote the interests of depositing creditors. See 1 GEnos,
CoRPoRATE REORGANIZATIONs (1936) 133. But it would seem that distinction might be
drawn between cases where the purchase of claims is made upon full disclosure and ac-
curate representation and those where inequitable conductl is disclosed. Rigid adherence
to a strict fiduciary concept in interpreting the limitation provision may prove too nar-
row. The Avon Park case indicates that the requirement of full disclosure can be broad-
ened on equitable grounds. An overemphasized certainty of prediction may well be
sacrificed to the paramount consideration of protecting creditors and investors by flexible
adjustment of the remedy.
43. Problems of proof would presumably be greater in an independent action. The
tendency of the courts to adhere to a strict fiduciary rationale could not be obviated.
44. But cf. Security-First Nat- Bank v. Rindge Land & Navig. Co., 85 F. (2d) 557
(C. C. A. 9th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 613 (1937). "Section 77B . . . does not
purport to alter long established incidents of property by introducing a -ague and inde-
finable 'equity' into the proceedings." Supra at 561-2.
45. But cf. In re Lubliner & Trinz Theatres, 100 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 7th, 193S).
See the relationship of the parties in it re Indiana Central Tel. Co., 24 F. Supp. 342
(D. Del. 1938), although there was no evidence of fraud or overreaching.
46. The situation involved in In re McEwen's Laundry, 90 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A.
6th, 1937), discussed supra note 37, might well call for limitation upon amount of partici-
pation, if claims had been acquired by unfair dealing.
47. Speculation alone is not a danger. See In re Consolidated Rock Prod. Co., 114
F. (2d) 102, 104 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) aff'd sub nor. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v.
DuBois, 9 U. S. L. NVzrzn 4216 (U. S. 1941). Too rigid restriction upun sp--ula-
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Chapter IX contained no provision permitting the court to limit in amount
claims acquired by protective committees or their members in contemplation
of or during proceedings. The Court in the principal case indicated, how-
ever, that the scope of the bankruptcy court's power at least includes the
power to deny compensation to committee members in such situations.
48
Furthermore, remedial legislation aimed at dangers in the uncontrolled use
of the fiscal agency device has recently been enacted 4) directing courts to
scrutinize contracts, acceptances, deposit agreements and other papers relating
to a proposed plan in order to determine compensation received by repre-
sentatives of creditors or the petitioner. Where speculative activity is possible,
the judge may refuse confirmation and assess costs against the offender.
A vigorous policy in enforcing the scrutiny clause, coupled with the broadened
equitable powers of bankruptcy courts, should go far in eliminating subtle
machinations from compositions under Chapter IX.
The Court's opinion in the Avon Park case serves well as a reminder that
the equity power possessed by a bankruptcy court is a potent weapon in the
every day conduct of debtor proceedings. Seemingly rigid doctrines such
as the priority rule of the Boyd case, apparent omissions in the various statu-
tory provisions for rehabilitations, unnecessarily narrow scope' of some statu-
tory grants of power - all of these seem destined to be softened in their
impact. So long as reorganizations, which are essentially problems of read-
justment of economic status and redistribution of entrepreneurial power, must
take place within the confines of statutory and judicial rules-of-thumb, it is
vitally necessary to provide a compensatory power by which courts can cope
with the occasional inequities which arise.
WITHDRAWAL OF DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAX
JURISDICTION *
JURISDICTIONAL limitations upon state taxing power have, until recently,
been found in an elaborately complex system of doctrine, erected by judicial
logic upon slim Constitutional foundations. When a state tax was laid upon
five activity would depress the market prices of claims and prevent financially pressed
creditors from unloading prior to lengthy reorganization proceedings. But speculation
accompanied by inequitable conduct should be curbed.
48. See American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 61 Sup. Ct. 157, 162
(U. S. 1940). Cf. Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 493 (U. S. 1941)
(compensation denied in a Chapter X proceeding where members were serving conflicting
interests); In re Paramount Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S. D. N. Y, 1935) (7713
proceeding).
49. Pub. L. No. 669, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 28, 1940). See (1940) A3 Coiu,.
REORG. AND Am. BANK. RaV. 335-9. Cf. § 249.
*Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 246 (U. S. 1940).
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material property or upon a person, the relatively simple issues of geographical
location1 or domicile 2 obviated jurisdictional controversy. But in the case
of taxes upon intangibles - upon a transaction, a chose-in-action, a transfer
at death, or receipt of income- jurisdictional status became a higlfdy fic-
tional concept.3 While it is axiomatic that a state may not tax beyond the
limits of its sovereignty, 4 recourse to the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment proved necessary in order to provide a convenient ration-
alization for most of the jurisdiction-to-tax decisions.5 Taxation without
jurisdiction was treated as bare extortion. But jurisdiction, to the Supreme
Court, was very largely a matter of legal doctrine rather than economic fact."
Underlying the polished conceptualism of the cases, however, lay a very
real and practical problem of protecting interstate economic activity from
multiple and thus unconscionable local exactions. It is a problem of the same
order, though wider in scope, as that presented by the commerce clause and
the decisions construing it as a limitation upon state power to tax. Thus
many cases involving taxes upon corporate business have been decided upon
the dual grounds of interstate commerce and due process from the same
factual basis.7 Since, however, the commerce clause has been interpreted to
permit non-discriminatory state taxes upon interstate enterprise s protesting
corporate taxpayers have of necessity come to rely more upon the jurisdic-
tional objection.
1. Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); see Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 488-489 (1925).
2. See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932) and cases there col-
lected at 279-280.
3. Rhode I. Hosp. Tr. Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926); Travis v. Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60 (1920); Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 (1905).
4. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 429 (U. S. 1819) ; Curry v. McCanless,
307 U. S. 357, 366 (1939).
5. The first was Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
Previously, jurisdiction to tax decisions had had no specific constitutional basis, but
had been written in terms of the attributes of sovereignty, McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819) ; or in terms of ultra vires acts of state legislatures, Rail-
road Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262 (U. S. 1868). The early "due-process" cases are
summarized, and their application to the privilege tax situation analysed by Hughes, J.
in Provident Savings Life Assur. Soc. v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103, 112 (1915).
6. See, for instance, the opinions in Provident Savings Life Assur. Soc. v. Kentucky,
239 U. S. 103 (1915) ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Penn., 238 U. S. 143 (1915) ; Maxwell
v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920); Rhode L
Hosp. Tr. Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926). Compare the less doctrinaire approach
of Holmes, J. in St Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U. S. 346 (1922).
7. Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939); Looney v. Crane Co.,
245 U. S. 178 (1917); Kansas City Co. v. Botldn, 240 U. S. 227 (1916) ; International
Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135 (1918) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306
U.S. 167 (1939); Pacific Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939).
8. For collection of cases and historical summary of liberalized treatment of state
taxes upon interstate commerce see Justice Stone's opinion in McGoldrick v. Bervind-
White, 309 U. S. 33, 45-50 (1940).
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Most of the standard arguments upon the jurisdictional issue - the dis-
tinction between the "subject" and the "measure" of a tax,0 the benefit-burden
theory,' 0 the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions," the concepts of com-
mercial domicile of corporations' 2 and business situs of intangible wealth la
- had been worked out by the Supreme Court prior to 1930. All of these
were engrafted upon the two original propositions, that the domiciliary state
taxed a person and his intangible personalty 14 and that realty and tangible
personalty were subject to in rem taxation wherever they were found. 15 The
system lacked internal consistency at many points, 10 resulting in limited pre-
dictability and abundant litigation.
9. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919) ; see Rhode I. v. Doughton, 270 U. S.
69, 81 (1926); accord, Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 (1931). For
an implicit recognition of the distinction in an early case see The Delaware R. R. Tax,
18 Wall. 206 (U. S. 1873). See Isaacs, The Subject and Measure of Taxation (1926) 26
COL. L. REv. 939.
10. Mr. Justice Holmes was an early exponent of this theory. See his opinion in
Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 205 (1903) and his dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U. S. 586, 595 (1930). See Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts (1918) 31 HAIv. L.
REv. 905.
11. While a state was allowed reasonable liberty in attaching conditions to its grant
of business privileges to foreign corporations, certain conditions were deemed funda-
mentally contradictory to basic constitutional doctrine and therefore unenforceable.
Fidelity & Dep. v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426 (1926); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178
(1917). Nor could foreign corporations be required to purchase relief from ouster by
paying taxes on property which was immune through foreign situs. People ex rel Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202 (1920).
12. Under this theory a state in which the management and control of a corporation
are localized may tax to the full extent of its intangibles, even though the corporation
is legally domiciled elsewhere. The concept was not openly adopted by the Supreme
Court until Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936) and Southern Nat. Gas.
Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148 (1937). But state courts had conceived it much
earlier. State v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co., 188 Ala. 514, 66 So. 178 (1914); Com-
monwealth v. United Cig. Mach. Co., 119 Va. 447, 89 S. E. 935 (1916).
13. DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376 (1919); Liverpool & London & Globe Ins.
Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346 (1911); Board of Assessors of Orleans v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 216 U. S. 517 (1910); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New
Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (1907); Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133 (1900).
14. At common law the maxim "mobilia sequuntur personam" was applied to taxation
of intangibles. Except where the "business situs" exception is appropriate [note 13
suipra] the domiciliary state of the owner still has this broad tax power. Newark Fire
Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S. 313 (1939); Blodgett v. Silberman,
277 U. S. 1 (1928) ; Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U. S. 325 (1920).
See Lowndes, State Jurisdiction to Tax Income (1932) 6 TEmp. L. Q. 486.
15. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U. S. 503 (1929); see Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920).
16. See Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1166; Car-
penter, Jurisdiction Over Debts (1918) 31 HARv. L. Rnv. 905; Lowndes, Spurious Con-
cepts of the Constitutional Law of Taxation (1934) 47 HAgv. L. REV. 628; Rate and
Measure in Jurisdiction to Tax (1936) 49 HAav. L. REV. 756. A fairly complete collection
of periodical literature on the subject is made in notes to Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-
Another Word (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 582.
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The Farmer's Loan'7 and Baldwin s8 cases in 1930 inaugurated a period
of about seven years in which one group of Justices struggled valiantly,
especially in the death-tax field but also in the field of business taxes, to do
away entirely with multi-state taxation by assigning each taxable object or
activity to a single jurisdiction, and so to establish a new ideal of "one person,
one subject, one tax."' 19 Mr. Justice Stone's minority, never accepting the
theory that the Fourteenth Amendment flatly outlawed multi-state taxation,
induced a gradual inroad of exceptions to the new majority rule until the
rule itself collapsed from want of substance and was specifically rejected in
1937 and 1938.20 For a short time thereafter and to a limited extent, the
Court appeared to concern itself with the underlying practicalities of tax-
jurisdiction cases- with an economic analysis of the ultimate incidence of
the tax, and with a comparison of the taxpayer's burden to the privileges
offered by the state in return. "Reasonableness" seemed to be the test of
constitutionality.2 ' With the Newark Fire Insurance case, however, it became
evident that some Justices were no more inclined to apply a test of economic
reasonableness than they were to retain the earlier doctrinaire approach.
Taxation, they said, is a "phase of empirical legislation" and "belongs to the
range of experimental activities of government." Where there is no claim
of state encroachment upon national powers, the Court should not intervene
in the "autonomous area of the legislative taxing power."2- Under this theory,
17. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930). Six Justices
disapproved the tax on the ground that New York's right to tax was superior to that
of Minnesota and that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade double taxation. Stone, J.
concurred in the result because Minnesota neither "potentially nor actually played any
beneficial part in the transfer." Holmes and Brandeis, JJ. dissented.
18. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930). Stone, J., who opposed the Farmer's
Loan tax (supra note 17), voted with the dissent (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.) here
because Missouri had "benefited" the transfer through the assistance of her legal
machinery. This was the first case to draw a sharp distinction between the no-double-
tax theory based on the Fourteenth Amendment and the theory that for every benefit
conferred a tax could be exacted in recompense.
19. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minn., supra note 17, at 212; Beidler v. South
Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S. 1 (1930); First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312
(1932). The last of these opinions predicted a further tightening of jurisdictional
limitations.
20. Such an outcome seemed inevitable from the time of the unanimous adoption of
a benefit-burden theory in Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932). Further
momentum was given by Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936); New
York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (1937) ; First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minne-
sota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937). The coup de grace was administered in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. 19 (1938).
21. See Great A. & P. Co. v. Grossjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937) ; Ford Motor Co. v.
Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331 (1939); New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 303
(1937); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383
(1939).
22. Frankfurter, Stone, Black, and Douglas, JJ. concurring in Newark Fire Ins.
Co. v. State Bd. of Tax App., 307 U. S. 313, 323 (1939).
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except in cases of grossest injustice, the aggrieved taxpayer must seek his
remedy by legislative reformation rather than by invocation of constitutional
stricture in the courts. This tendency toward judicial abdication in the tax-
jurisdiction field continues, although the extent to which it may ultimately
go is still uncertain.
The most recent case on the subject, Wisconsin v. J. C. Pennoy Co.,23
illustrates some of the difficulties caused by the unsettled attitude of the
Court. Wisconsin imposed a "Privilege Dividend Tax" upon the declaration
and receipt of dividends out of corporate income earned in Wisconsin, and
directed the paying corporations to deduct the amount of this tax from their
distributions to stockholders, regardless of the domicile of either corporation
or stockholder. 24 Penney Co., a Delaware corporation authorized to do
business in Wisconsin and commercially domiciled in New York,2 5 success-
fully attacked the constitutionality of the tax in the Wisconsin courts 20 on
the theory of Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson,= that a
state was powerless to tax a transaction performed wholly out of the state.
The Supreme Court reversed this judgment and upheld the tax.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion rests in part upon the assumed
equivalence of this tax to a supplementary corporate income tax, with deferred
liability, on Penney Co.'s Wisconsin earnings. While a careful analysis of
the incidence of the tax casts grave doubt upon the validity of this assump-
tion,28 it is probably not wise in any event to attach much importance to the
23. 61 Sup. Ct. 246 (U. S. 1940). Two companion cases were decided on the
authority of this decision: Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co,, 61 Sup. Ct.
253 (U. S. 1940); Wisconsin v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 395 (U. S. 1940).
The state court opinion is noted in 88 U. OF PENN. L. REv. 1025; 24 MIxx. L. R. 711,
24 MARQ. L. Ra.v. 167 (1940).
24. Wisc. Laws 1935, c. 505, § 3 as amended by c. 552: "(1) For the privilege of
declaring and receiving dividends, out of income derived from property located and
business transacted in this state, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to two and one half
percentum of the amount of such dividends declared and paid by all corporations
(foreign and local) after the passage of this act . . . Such tax shall be deducted
and withheld from such dividends payable to residents and non-residents by the payor
corporation . . . (3) Every such corporation hereby made liable for such tax shall
deduct the amount of such tax from the dividends so declared."
25. The company maintained its principal office in New York, held its directors'
meetings there, and paid its dividends with checks drawn upon New York city banks.
Something less than 4% of the company's total income for the taxable year here
in question was derived from Wisconsin. Over 96% of its stockholders owning 98%
of its stock reside outside Wisconsin. The company does business in and distributes
dividends to all of the 48 states.
26. Penney Co. v. Tax Comm'r, 233 Wis. 286, 289 N.W. 677 (1940). The Wis-
consin Court felt constrained, on the authority of the Connclicut General case [Eifra
note 29], to overrule its prior judgment of constitutional validity given in State cx rel.
Froedtert G. & M. Co. v. Tax Comm'r, 221 Wis. 225, 265 N.W. 672 (1936).
27. 303 U. S. 77 (1938).
28. The United States Treasury Department has decided that the tax is upon the
stockholder rather than the corporation, and has allowed income tax deductions accord-
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doctrinal rationale. Insofar as it advances the purely nominal argument that
the same exaction is good as an income tax and bad as an excise, this part
of the opinion must be regarded as no more than a conventional gesture
to outmoded formula.
The opinion says as much-when it dismisses these considerations as "merely
a reformulation of the classic approach of this Court to the taxing power
of the states." The real basis for the holding is stated thus:
"At best, the responsibility for devising just and productive sources
of revenue challenges the wits of legislators. Nothing can be less
helpful than for courts to go beyond the extremely limited restrictions
that the Constitution places upon the states and to inject themselves
in a merely negative way into the delicate processes of fiscal policy-
making." 2 9
While the minority opinion does not disapprove, because it does not recog-
nize, the abdication argument of the majority, it does indicate the incom-
patibility of the decision with doctrinal precedent, particularly with the recent
Connecticut Genwral case.30 There the Court had explicitly declined to look
beyond the immediate object of the tax to the "ultimate thrust of economic
benefits and burdens." It had recognized that accurate allocation among
forty-eight states of ultimate source and destination of values arising from
an integrated national economy was a practical impossibility, and that juris-
ingly. XV. IxT. R y. BuLL. No. 2, at 142 (1936). The Wisconsin State Tax Com-
mission has unofficially taken a similar position in a letter to the Corporation Trust
Co., C. C. H. Corporation Tax Serv. for Wisc., 10-640.19. This interpretation is
plainly in accord with the intent of the statute. See note 24 supra.
29. 61 Sup. Ct. 246 at 250 (U. S. 1940).
30. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, S0 (1938). There
California had taxed premiums on reinsurance contracts made in Connecticut to cover
California policies, calling the tax an excise upon the insurer for the privilege of doing
California business. The tax was struck down by the Supreme Court because no act
in the performance or discharge of the contracts was done within the taxing state.
Mr. Justice Stone is the only individual who voted with the majority both in the Con-
necticut General and Penney cases. The other four majority votes in the Penney case
came from Black, J., who dissented from the Connecticut General opinion, and from
Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., who joined the Court after that decision.
While one can only speculate upon the distinction which underlay Justice Stone's shift,
it seems possible that he was impressed by Justice Frankfurter's assumption that the
Privilege Dividend Tax was equivalent to a supplementary income tax. If this were
true, there would be a much closer connection between the Wisconsin tax and Wisconsin
earnings than there was between the California tax and the underlying California life
insurance which formed the subject of the Connecticut General reinsurance contracts.
If, however, the Privilege Dividend Tax be considered an excise (Wisconsin court's
view) and not an income tax (Justice Frankfurter's view) there is a much weaker
case for state power than in the California case. See exhaustive analysis along these
lines in Penney Co. v. Tax Comm., 233 Wis. 286, 296, 289 N.W. 677, 6S0--63 (1940).
The importance of determining Justice Stone's rationale lies in the pivotal position
which he seems to occupy on this question at the moment.
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dictional limitations must be stated in terms of immediate rather than ultimate
objects of taxation.31
If the Penney decision were taken seriously upon the doctrinal level, it
would be difficult to estimate the magnitude of its effect upon future tax
development. Hitherto the Court has been willing to allow extra-territorial
factors to enter into the measure of a tax providing always that the subject
was within the taxing jurisdiction.82 A chain store privilege tax could be
measured by the national size of the chain.33 But an excise measured by
intrastate insurance business could not be validly imposed upon a subject,
a reinsurance contract, which was wholly extra-state.3 4 While the Wisconsin
tax in the instant case was measured by intrastate income, it was expressly,
beyond shadow of doubt of legislative intention, imposed upon an out-of-
state transaction - "on the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends." 85
The logical extensions of this decision are at least startling from an historical
perspective, however acceptable they may seem a priori. One is led to believe,
for instance, that a state could impose a property tax upon extra-territorial
tangible property which could be shown to have grown out of earnings from
within that state,36 or that it could impose an inheritance tax upon the suc-
cession to shares of corporate stock merely because some of the capital assets
of the corporation were located within the state.3 7 If the Court in the Penney
case meant to say that the only nexus between a state and a taxable object
necessary to perfect jurisdiction is the fact that the object is the economic
31. See Merrill, supra note 16, at 594, n. 76, 77; Harding, State Jurisdiction to Tax
Dividends and Stock Profits to Natural Persons (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REv. 139, 152-154;
Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Guery, 283 U. S. 376 (1931); accord, Domeneck v. United
Porto Rican Sugar Co., 62 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932), cert. denlied, 289 U. S.
739 (1933).
32. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 (1931) ; James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 138 (1937); accord, Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525
(1912) ; New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 (1907). For a criticism of
this slippery distinction, see Lowndes, Spurious Concepts of the Constitutional Lazo of
Taxation (1934) 47 HARV. L. Rxv. 628.
33. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Grossjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937).
34. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77 (1938).
35. See part of taxing statute set out supra note 24. Completely inconsistent with
the 'Court's attempt to metamorphose this tax into a corporate income tax is a very
recent decision in which a unanimous opinion read, partly: "The determination of the
state court as to the incidence of the tax has great weight with us, and, when it follows
logically the language of the act, as here, is controlling." Colorado Bank v. Bedford,
310 U. S. 41, 52 (1940).
36. The dissent in the instant case took this view: "An ad valorem property tax
by Wisconsin [on property purchased out of past earnings] could be quite as easily
justified under the label of an income tax because the property represented income
once received, as the present tax, on the declaration and receipt of dividends out of
earned surplus." 61 Sup. Ct. 246, 252. Similar arguments were made by counsel in
this and companion cases. Such a tax would be irreconcilable with the leading case on
due process as a basic requirement of taxing jurisdiction. Union Refrig. Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
37. An unconstitutional tax under Rhode I. Hosp. Tr. Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S.
69 (1926).
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embodiment of income formerly earned within state borders, it will become
possible for a state to pursue and tax its capital exports to a degree never
before thought possible, and the area of potential multi-state taxation will
be considerably increased. Although a development of the implications of
this case to their logical extreme is unlikely, the fact that they are so far
out of line with doctrinal precedent3 8 suggests that the Court is clinging
merely to the theory, but not to the substance, of judicial regulation of state
tax jurisdiction.
Nor can the decision be explained any more satisfactorily upon a theory
of reasonableness of practical effect than upon a conceptual theory. No
detailed practical analysis of the tax was briefed or argued before the Court.3 0
Mr. justice Frankfurter's generalizations about the relation betw.een the exer-
cise of Wisconsin's taxing power to the benefits which it has conferred, and
his statement that the tax "gains nourishing significance when placed in the
context of the Wisconsin taxing system" °40 fail to account for numerous
economic facts which an empirical investigation of the tax incidence would
certainly have disclosed. By the terms of the statute the tax must be deducted
from the dividend checks of individual stockholders. The stockholders, and
not the corporation, are the tax-payers. 41 Counsel for the taxpayer estimate
that these deductions are so small as to be less than the cost of hiring ac-
countants to compute them on blocks of stock of less than sixty shares.4 2
In its practical operation the tax is excessively burdensome and raises diffi-
culties which would never arise if the tax were, as the Court seemed to
think it was, merely a corporate income tax. In the case of a corporation
having preferred stock, for instance, if the tax is deducted from the preferred
holder's contractual six per cent, he may protest that corporate taxes must'
first be paid out of the common stock equity, and that no foreign state can
alter his contract. If the tax is not deducted from preferred dividends, the
common stockholder will protest that the terms of the taxing statute are
not being followed. And finally, in its context in the Wisconsin tax-struc-
ture, this tax looks much more like a devious way of preserving an existing
discrimination in favor of stockholders in local enterprises over stockholders
in foreign corporations, than like a device to "equalize burdens." 43
38. See Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes (1931) 44
HAmv. L. REv. 1075, 1097, erroneously predicting that a tax such as the one in the
instant case would be invalidated.
39. Upon petition for rehearing in the Supreme Court, Penney Co. set forth in detail
for the first time an economic analysis of the "ultimate thrust" of the tax which demon-
strates the material, practical difference between this and a corporate income tax.
Petition of Respondent for Rehearing and Brief in Support Tiereof, Wisconsin v.
Penney Co., Supreme Court (Oct. term, 1940) No. 46. The petition was denied. 9 U. S. L
Var 3185 (U. S. 1940).
40. Wisconsin v. Penney Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 246, 249 (U. S. 1940).
41. See note 24 supra.
42. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 39, at 26.
43. Cf. note 24 supra. The Court evidently considered the tax as an elaborate
attempt on Wisconsin's part to achieve a just taxation of corporate dividends, which
are exempt under the personal income tax. Actually the tax seems designed to per-
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The unwillingness of the Court to act as moderator of state taxing juris-
diction either on a theory of legal doctrine or economic reasonableness finds
its parallel in the current treatment of state taxes upon interstate commerce.
justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter are somewhat in advance of any
practical majority combination on the Supreme Court in their view that
state taxing power should remain unhampered unless and until Congress
exercises its plenary power under the commerce clause for taxation as well
as regulation.4 4 But even here the recent Best 45 decision, which is a seeming
qualification of the Berwind-White4 6 case, serves notice that the Court has
not forgotten the use of its ancient arsenal of doctrinal weapons to strike
down a particularly outrageous extortion.
In the commerce clause cases there is a very clear and definite alternative
to judicial control of state taxing power -the superior power of Congress
itself.47 In the jurisdictional field the alternative to judicial control is not as
apparent. Obviously some authority must control our forty-eight independent
taxing administrations, or else business must confine itself within Balkanized
state boundaries -escaping multi-state taxation by the primitive method of
keeping out of reach of foreign tax-collectors. That temporary, local self-
interest is likely to prevail over long term national considerations in the
absence of exertion of national authority is abundantly demonstrated by the
recent growth of interstate economic barriers of all sorts.48
Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting in the Berwind-White case, admitted the
desirability of a comprehensive system of national taxation through state and
federal cooperation.49 While it is conceivable that such a scheme could be
worked out among the several states by way of enactment of uniform laws
or by interstate compact, as a practical matter, Congressional leadership is
necessary, particularly if the solution is to be achieved in time to prevent
an interregnum outbreak of crippling local taxes.
petuate the system by which large resident holdings of local corporate stock are taxed
uniformly at the corporate level instead of progressively at the stockholder level. Dividend
receipts are not taxable to Wisconsin residents if 50% of the corporation's net income
was earned in Wisconsin. Obviously this exemption benefits only stockholders of local
companies.
44. See Justice Black's dissenting opinions in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S.
307, 316 (1938), and in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 442
(1939) ; also the dissent of Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, JJ., in McCarroll v. Dixie
Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 183 (1940).
45. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 61 Sup. Ct. 334 (U. S. 1940). A tax which, it forto,
could have been sustained under the Berwind-White ruling was struck down as unduly
discriminatory against interstate commerce in amount and practical effect.
46. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Min. Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
47. The commerce clause is, of course, essentially a grant of power to Congress
and only incidentally, by judicial construction, a limitation on the states. U. S. CONST.
Art. I, § 8(3).
48. Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1253;
Meyer, State Barriers to Highway Transportation (1940) 8 GEO. WAsh. L. REv. 1070;
Note (1938) 38 CoL L. REv. 1084.
49. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33, 69 (1940).
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Congress might find its Constitutional authorization in the almost forgotten
last section of the Fourteenth Amendment,50 which empowers Congress "to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." On a
practical level the same sanction to secure state cooperation might be em-
ployed as in the social security legislation 5' - the imposition of heavy federal
taxes upon corporate and personal incomes, with provision for refund of
the proceeds to those states which bring their own tax systems into line with
the federal planA2
In the wake of the Court's abdication from policing the jurisdiction-to-tax
field temporary confusion is bound to result. The instant case confirms the
trend toward abdication and increases the confusion. But judicial regulation
has never been wholly satisfactory here and, in a backhanded way, this
decision may be welcome because it makes the need for Congressional action
more urgent and more obvious.
INDISPENSABILITY OF SUPERIOR OFFICERS IN SUITS AGAINST
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS*
AMONG the various rules advanced by courts for refusing to interfere vith
administrative action, one of the most troublesome and difficult of application
prescribes that a subordinate administrative officer will not be enjoined in
the absence of a superior deemed to be an indispensable party to the suit.
Adherence to the rule results in dismissal where the indispensable party is
a non-resident who does not consent to be sued.' It is therefore of especial
50. U. S. CoxsT. AmEND. XIV, § 5. See restricted interpretation of this clause in
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 10-14 (1883); In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 555. But
query whether these nineteenth century views on federal power would prevail today.
51. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); cf. Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
52. Rodell, supra note 16, at 1181-1185.
* Connecticut Importing Co. v. Perkins, 35 F. Supp. 414 (D. Conn. 1940); A. H.
Belo Corp. v. Street, 35 F. Supp. 430 (N. D. Tex. 1940).
1. If the superior is a non-resident, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person unless he consents to suit or is served within the district. A second difficulty is
presented by the general venue statute, 49 STaT. 1213 (1936), 28 U. S. C. § 112 (Supp.
1939), which provides that, except in diversity cases, the defendant may be sued only in
his own district. While the defendant willing to be sued would ordinarily confer juris-
diction over his person by consent and waive his objection to venue, the requirements are
distinct. Thus a defendant served within the district would still be able to ubject to venue.
The pragmatic distinction between necessary and indispensable parties is that the court
cannot proceed without indispensable parties even if joining them divests it of jurisdic-
tion. For a general exposition see 2 MoorE, FERA.L PP.ccnm (1938) 2133-2163. See
also dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553,
616-618 (1923); Address of Charles E. Clark, Proceedings of the American Bar Ass'n
Institute at Washington, D. C., Oct. 6, 7, 8, 1938 (1939) 05.
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importance in federal administrative law,2 where a finding of indispensability
may be used to limit suits against federal agencies to the District of Columbia,
in which superior federal officers normally reside.3
The unwillingness of many federal courts to reach this severe result in
practice has produced a penumbra of uncertainty about the indispensability
rule, to which the Supreme Court has contributed in its two leading decisions
on the doctrine. In 1924 in Gnerich v. Rutter4 the Court, after a long interval
during which the rule had fallen into desuetude,3 revived it in holding that
a suit to enjoin a local prohibition director from enforcing a withdrawal
order authorized by regulations issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue should have been dismissed in the absence of the Commissioner,
whose power to issue the regulations had been attacked.; A year later, when
the State of Colorado sued to enjoin the superintendent of the Rocky Moun-
tain National Park from enforcing regulations issued by the Secretary of
the Interior on the ground that their subject matter exceeded the authority
ceded by the State, the Court held in Colorado v. Toll7 that the Secretary
2. For discussions of superior federal administrative officers as indispensable par-
ties, see Alpert, Suits Against Administrative Agencies Under N.I.R.A. and A.A.A.
(1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 393, 405-411; (1937) 32 ILL. L. REV. 99; (1937) 37 COL.
L. Rav. 140; (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 342; (1937) 50 HARV. L. RI-v. 796. Perhaps
because of the relatively greater convenience of suing state administrative superiors in
their own districts, state litigation is infrequent. McCarter v. Dungan, 74 N. J. Eq. 251,
68 AtI. 1096 (Ch. 1908) ; Castleman v. Rainey. 211 S. W. 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
One federal court decision on state officials found the superior indispensable. Strutwear
Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936).
3. The official residence of the superior controls for the purposes of the venue stat-
ute. A suit attempted against the Secretary of Agriculture in his home district in Iowa
was dismissed on this ground, on his objection to the venue. Nesbitt Fruit Products v.
Wallace, 17 F. Supp. 141 (S. D. Iowa 1936). Of course, if suit were brought against the
superior in the District of Columbia, and the subordinate were found indispensable, the
latter could raise the same objections, lack of jurisdiction over his person and improper
venue, thus rendering any judicial review impossible. But this argument does not seem
to have been made.
4. 265 U. S. 388 (1924).
5. The Supreme Court applied the indispensability rule narrowly in Warner Val-
ley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U. S. 28 (1897), refusing to order the issuance of a land
patent or to enjoin trespasses by Government officials in the absence of the Secretary of
the Interior. But between 1897 and Gnerich v. Rutter in 1924, injunctive relief was regu-
larly granted against subordinates in the absence of superiors, without the point being
raised either by courts or litigants. American School of Magnetic Healing v. MeAnnulty,
187 U. S. 94 (1902); Swigart v. Baker, 229- U. S. 187 (1913); Magruder v. Belle
Fourche Valley Water Users Ass'n, 219 Fed. 72 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914). A list of such
cases is cited in the argument of appellant in Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 508 (1925).
In that case the Court, explaining that these earlier cases were not inconsistent with
Gnerich v. Rutter, stated that "the point was in the cases if anyone had seen fit to raise
it." It has been said that a court may raise the point sua sponte. Alcohol Warehouse
Corp. v. Canfield, 11 F. (2d) 214, 216 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). In Gnerich v. Rutter the
issue was first raised in the circuit court of appeals.
6. 265 U. S. 388, 391 (1924).
7. 268 U. S. 228 (1925).
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was not an indispensable party. Since the Court supplied no basis for
distinguishing indispensability in the two cases and none of the distinctions
attempted by lower courts has won general acceptance,8 the two holdings
have acquired in some measure the status of alternative authorities. In a
field where uniformity is important and ad hoc rulings least to be desired,
the indispensability doctrine has become an obstacle, instead of a guide, to
orderly litigation.
Much of the difficulty which judges have experienced with the rule may
be traced to a lack of agreement over its origin and content. One learned
federal judge confessed that he could "conjure up" no explanation for the
rule better than the possibility that enjoining a subordinate without binding
his superior might expose the subordinate to a crossfire between court and
superior.9 Another supposed danger is that the superior might render the
decree nugatory by appointing a different subordinate to perform the act
enjoined.' 0 Both arguments appeal to unreality in view of the structure and
habits of administrative agencies, which are hardly likely either to instruct
subordinates to disregard court orders on pain of contempt, or to make
changes in personnel merely to frustrate an injunction. Similarly, any fear
that, absent the rule, federal agencies might be hamstrung by decrees entered
without actual notice to superior officers seems imaginary. In practice, plain-
tiffs often join and serve the non-resident superior, who sometimes makes
a special appearance to secure dismissal," leaving the subordinate to argue
the indispensability issue before the tribunal.-
8. The opinion in Colorado v. Toll does not mention Gnrich v. Ruttcr. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, after purporting to limit Colorado v. Toll to cases where state
power is at issue (Ifoore v. Anderson, 68 F. (2d) 191, 195 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933)), later
extended it to cases where superior and subordinate were acting beyond the authority
conferred on them by statute. Berdie v. Kurtz, 75 F. (2d) 898 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935);
Hill v. Darger, 76 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), aff'g, 8 F. Supp. 1S9 (S. D. Cal.
1934). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly intimated that Colorado v.
Toll would govern in an attack on an unconstitutional statute or unauthorized act. Fer-
ris v. Wilbur, 27 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928). The act complained of in Gucrich Z'.
Rutter was, however, alleged to be unauthorized. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
appears to have followed both rules. Cf. Rood v. Goodman, 83 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 5th,
1936); Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934), rcv'd on
other grounds sub moin. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 3S3 (1935); Yarnell
v. Hillsborough Packing Co., 70 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). See also Carr v.
Desjardines, 16 F. Supp. 346 (W. D. Okla. 1936); Consolidated Gas Co. v. Hardy, 14 F.
Supp. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); Wheeler v. Farley, 7 F. Supp. 433 (S. D. Cal. 1934).
9. Learned Hand, J., in National Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman,
85 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), (1937) 4 U. or CHL L. Rnv. 342.
10. Alcohol Warehouse Corp. v. Canfield, 11 F. (2d) 214, 215 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
11. This common procedure was adopted in one of the principal cases. Connecticut
Importing Co. v. Perkins, 35 F. Supp. 414, 416 (D. Conn. 1940).
12. Objection to the non-joinder of an indispensable party may, under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, be made before trial under Rule 12(b) and 12(d), either by
motion to dismiss or by answer and preliminary hearing. Or a motion may be made
under Rule 21 for an order requiring the indispensable person to be made a party, dis-
missal to be granted if the party cannot be brought into court. Notes, 2 FED. Ruz.ns
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The real vitality of the rule is to be found, not in its jurisdictional aspect,
but in the fact that it may enable courts to repel plaintiffs who are seeking
to obtain untimely or otherwise improper relief from administrative action.
Thus it may be used to implement policies sanctioned by other rules, A
finding of indispensability may serve as a substitute for the final order rule,l"
by inhibiting interference with a subordinate who is performing an investi-
gatory function preliminary to the administrative action which the plaintiff
seeks to prevent. 1 4 Or the superior may be said to be indispensable in the
sense that the plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies within
the agency. Thus, the rule has been invoked to avoid restraining a regional
director for the National Labor Relations Board from taking testimony or
proceeding with a hearing before a trial examiner.' 5 Or it may be held that
the Attorney General is indispensable to a suit to enjoin actions under a
statute which he is directed to enforce, 10 although the suit might properly
be dismissed on other grounds.
17
But, despite the fact that application of the indispensability rule may in-
cidentally lead to a desirable result in certain situations, the rule itself is
both confusing and unnecessary when applied in conjunction with, or in
SEav. (1940) 658; Massachusetts Farmers' Defense Com. v. United States, 26 F. Supp.
941 (D. Mass. 1939). For procedure under the old practice, see Krouse v. Brevard Tan-
nin Co., 249 Fed. 538, 544 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918).
13. The final order rule, which is the administrative analogue of the final judgment
rule in appeals from courts, prescribes that judicial review of administrative action may
be had only when the administrative process has been completed with regard to the
individual complainant, thus excluding review of interlocutory orders and mere declara-
tions of status. The authoritative statement of finality for the purposes of judicial re-
view, supplanting the old dichotomy of "negative" and "affirmative" orders, is contained
in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939).
14. For a consideration of the relation between the final order rule and the indis-
pensability rule, see Bradley Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936);
cf. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp. v. Nylander, 14 F. Supp. 201 (S. D. Cal. 1936).
15. Bradley Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936). The
administrative remedies to which plaintiff is limited include raising his objection at a
hearing before the trial examiner, objecting to the intermediate report rendered before
the final decision by the Board, and objecting in the circuit court of appeals when the
Board applies for enforcement of its order. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp,, 303
U. S. 41 (1938); Sanco Piece Dye Works v. Herrick, 33 F. Supp. 80 (S. D. N. Y.
1940); cf. Chester C. Fosgate Co. v. Kirkland, 19 F. Supp. 152 (S. D. Fla. 1937). See
Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 981.
16. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 67 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933);
cf. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Hardy, 14 F. Supp. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
17. One ground might be that contesting the proceedings when brought would pro-
vide an adequate remedy at law, a result related to the exhaustion rule. Federal Trade
Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927); John Blood & Co., Inc. v. Mad-
den, 15 F. Supp. 779 (E. D. Pa. 1936) ; see note 15 supra; cf. Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923). A declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a statute
may be refused against the Attorney General on the theory that it will not be presumed
that he will attempt the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute, and that therefore no
case or controversy exists. Southern Pacific Co. v. Conway, 115 F. (2d) 746 (C. C. A.
9th, 1940).
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lieu of, these independent requirements for judicial relief. That its appli-
cation may lead to equivocal results is illustrated in tvo recent cases' 8 in-
volving petitions for declaratory judgments under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.19 In Connecticut Importing Co. v. Perkins,°0 a wholesale liquor dealer
sought a declaratory judgment that he was not engaged in interstate cum-
merce and hence not subject to the Act. His complaint alleged that the
Administrator of the Wage & Hour Division of the Department of Labor
had issued an "interpretive bulletin" 2' stating that wholesalers purcha.sing
goods from other states for intrastate sale fell within the purview of the
Act, and that agents of the Division had investigated his business and had
advised him to comply with the Act. Named as defendants were the .\dmin-
istrator, the Secretary of Labor, the Connecticut Commissioner of Labor and
his deputy, and the federal attorney in the district. The Secretary of Labor
and the Administrator were granted dismissals as non-residents, the Con-
necticut state officials because they had no authority to enforce the Act.2
The issue then posed was whether any relief should be granted against the
district attorney, in the absence of the officials dismissed and of the Attorney
General. The court held that the superiors were not indispensable to relief,
and that if the plaintiff on amendment could show that the district attorney
had made any threats to prosecute, it would grant a declaration on the merits.
In the case of A. H. Belo Corp. v. StreCet2 3 a newspaper publisher sought
a similar declaration that he was not in interstate commerce and hence not
subject to the Act, naming the regional director as a defendant. It was alleged
that the director had threatened to proceed against the plaintiff through a
class suit as representative of the plaintiff's employees,2 4 and also to take
steps to enforce the Act in his official capacity.23 On the former ground the
court held that relief could be granted against the director personally in the
absence of his superiors. But it was held that no attack could be made on
him in his official capacity in the absence of the Administrator and the Attorney
General as indispensable parties.
18. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Perkins, 35 F. Supp. 414 (D. Conn. 1940); A. H.
Belo Corp. v. Street, 35 F. Supp. 430 (N. D. Te. 1940).
19. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. (Supp. 1939).
20. 35 F. Supp. 414 (D. Conn. 1940).
21. Wage & Hour Admin'r of the Dep't of Labor, Interpretative Bulletin No. 5,
Dec. 12, 1938.
22. "The Administrator may establish and utilize such regional, local, or other
agencies, and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from time to
time be needed." 52 STAT. 1061 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 204 (Supp. 1939).
23. 35 F. Supp. 430 (N. D. Tex. 1940).
24. Employees may sue on their own behalf or through a designated agent for their
unpaid minimum wages, plus an equal sum in liquidated danlages. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938),
29 U. S. C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1939).
25. By recommending enforcement action to the Administrator. An action by the
Administrator to restrain plaintiffs was pending in the same court. The technical dis-
position of the principal case was to overrule the director's motion to dismiss, and
transfer the case for trial with the administrator's action. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937). This fortuitous result did not affect the
court's position on indispensability.
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Viewed as attempts to define the concept of indispensability, the decisions
are irreconcilable. In the Connecticut Importing Co. case, even though the
plaintiff was seeking to test the validity of a regulation issued by the superior,
the latter was held not to be an indispensable party. In the Belo case, on the
other hand, where the only action alleged had been taken by the subordinate
and it did not appear that his superiors had either taken any action or were
threatening any, the superiors were held to be indispensable parties. The
Connecticut court proceeded on the theory that relief against a subordinate
should not be denied merely because it was incomplete in not binding the
superior.2 6 This proposition, that the plaintiff should be given what he asks
from any official party defendant he chooses, is logically a denial of any
effect whatever to the indispensability rule.2 The Texas court at the other
extreme supposed that the superior was indispensable to any action against
the subordinate in his official capacity.
28
The actual problem in both cases was not whether all the interested parties
were before the court, but whether at a given stage in the administrative
process the plaintiffs could secure a judicial interpretation of their status
under the Act. The problem would have remained if all the superiors named
were within the jurisdiction of the court and had been made parties to the
suit. It would seem that review was untimely in the Connecticut Importing
Co. case unless the plaintiff could show, not merely that the district attorney
had threatened to prosecute him, but that there was some reason why he
should not be compelled to present his defenses in that prosecution, either
for an injunction against violation of the Act 29 or for criminal penalties8 0
In the Belo case, although the effect of the decision was to deny the plaintiff
a declaratory judgment, the reasoning of the court depended entirely on the
absence of the superiors of the regional director, implying that relief would
have been proper in their presence. Yet this inference seems unjustified. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in which the Belo case arose, has denied review
of an administrative regulation under the same Act in a similar case on the
ground that a test prosecution afforded the plaintiff an adequate remedy,
after explicitly rejecting the argument that the Administrator was indis-
pensable.31 This result would seem to follow a fortiori when the plaintiff
was not attacking a specific regulation. In both the Connecticut Importing
Co. and the Belo cases, then, it would seem that there were adequate grounds
for denying relief regardless of the parties the plaintiff brought before the
26. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Perkins, 35 F. Supp. 414, 417 (D. Conn. 1940).
27. Any decree entered will, of -course, bind the individual defendant, and so pro-
vide some measure of relief. But the incompleteness of the relief is one of the elements
of the indispensability rule. Alcohol Warehouse Corp. v. Canfield, 11 F. (2d) 214, 215
(C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
28. A. H. Belo Corp. v. Street, 35 F. Supp. 430, 432 (N. D. Tex. 1940).
29. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 217 (Supp. 1939).
30. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §216 (Supp. 1939).
31. Janes v. Lake Wales Citrus Growers Ass'n, 110 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. Sth,
1940). This case was cited in the Belo opinion to support indispensability. Compare
Redlands Foothill Groves v. Jacobs, 30 F. Supp. 995 (S. D. Cal. 1940) with the holding
in the Belo case.
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court, and that statement of the results in terms of the indispensability rule
was misleading and unnecessary.
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff can show all the requisites for review
of an administrative action, the practical problem posed by the indispensa-
bility rule is whether or not he shall be required to seek relief in the District
of Columbia. Efforts to relax the rule to accommodate particular plaintiffs
have produced no coherent limitations. One criterion which might be simple
of administration, but which rests on little support in the cases, is that the
superior should be indispensable only when the relief requires affirmative
action on his part, such as the granting of a license or the disbursement of
funds.32 A more familiar judicial pronouncement is that if the suhurd.nate
is acting beyond his statutory or constitutional authority, he may be attacked
in the absence of his superior.33 This doctrine may be used in any of three
instances, often indistinct in practice. If the subordinate is acting without
warrant of law, he may of course be in the position of a private tortfeasor. ,
Or the plaintiff may complain that the subordinate is acting on the basis of
a regulation which was beyond the superior's authority under the statute.m
Finally, the plaintiff may attack the constitutionality of the statute under which
superior and subordinate alike are operating.3° The rationale of this limi-
tation is derived from the independent rule that, unless the plaintiff alleges
that the official sued is acting beyond his statutory or constitutional authority,
the suit is one against the sovereign and hence not maintainable without his
consent 37 But there is no reasonable connection between the dispensability
of the sovereign and of the superior. The former is a dogmatic prerequisite
to any judicial relief.38 The latter is a question of judicial policy resting on
32. This criterion is suggested and criticized in (1937) 50 HAuv. L. Rnv. 795. His-
torically, it is interesting in view of the opinion in Guerich v. Rutter, where the principal
authority relied on was the case of Vernon v. Blackerby, 2 Atk. 151 (Ch. 1740). In this
suit to compel the treasurer of a church building commission to pay a clergyman his
benefice, relief was denied by Lord Hardwicke in the absence of the commissioners,
without whose warrant the money could not be paid. It appeared that the fund had b-een
invested in lands, so that the subordinate would have been physically as well as legally
unable to obey a decree.
33. Since this is the point to be decided, the circularity of this test is apparent. "This
is not a bill to cancel the Secretary's regulations, but only to test their efficacy to pro-
tect defendants in their alleged trespasses against complainants' rights." Hence, the
Secretary is not indispensable. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1, 4
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934), re'd on other ground-t sub nom. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U. S. 388 (1935); cf. Carr v. Desjardines, 16 F. Supp. 346 (W. D. Okla. 1936).
34. See Moore v. Anderson, 68 F. (2d) 191, 195 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Castleman
v. Rainey, 211 S. W. 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
35. Berdie v. Kurtz, 75 F. (2d) 898 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Yarnell v. Hillsborough
Packing Co., 70 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
36. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934), rci'd or.
other grounds sub nom. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); cf. Web-
ster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507 (1925).
37. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912) ; Whitehead v. Cheves, 67 F.
(2d) 316 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
38. See the discussion of sovereign immunity in United States v. Lee, 106 U. S.
196 (1882); Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433 (1878).
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practical and equitable considerations. A limitation which says, in effect,
that the more fundamental the attack on the agency, the less necessity there
is to make it on a superior official, seems from the viewpoint of policy both
meaningless and undesirable.
A more direct solution to the problems created by the indispensability rule
has been suggested in connection with the review of postal fraud orders.
These orders, issued by the Postmaster General to deny the facilities of the
postoffice to persons using the mail for fraudulent purposes, are often attacked
by injunction suits against local postmasters, to restrain them from carrying
out the order by returning plaintiffs' mail, stamped fraudulent, to the senders. 0
The propriety of this form of review is doubtful under Gncrich v. Rutter,
the Second Circuit Court holding the Postmaster General indispensable4" and
the Fifth Circuit Court the contrary. 41 District courts have split on differing
theories of indispensability. 42 A critic of these holdings has suggested that
a practical escape from the dilemma would be a statutory provision placing
the venue of fraud order reviews in the plaintiff's district. 43
The simplicity of this solution suggests its extension to all reviews of
federal administrative action. A general provision, designed to remove ob-
jections both to venue and to personal jurisdiction,44 would enable the plaintiff
to join all the officials involved. This would be in harmony with the policy
of Congress, expressed in provisions for statutory review of administrative
bodies, to regulate the venue of review with regard to the convenience of
the individuals affected.4 5 For the inconvenience to a plaintiff maneuvered
39. An injunction against a local postmaster was sustained on the merits in Ameri-
can School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902). See (1937) 4 U.
OF .CHi. L. Ray. 342.
40. National Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman, 85 F. (2d) 66 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1936).
41. Rood v. Goodman, 83 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
42. Bailey Gaunce Oil & Refining Co. v. Duncan, 10 F. Supp. 280 (W. D. La. 1934)
(Postmaster General not indispensable; local postmaster analogized to sheriff attempting
to execute a null judgment); Wheeler v. Farley, 7 F. Supp. 433 (S. D. Cal. 1934),
appeal dism'd for want of jurisdiction, 293 U. S. 526 (1934) (Postmaster General indis-
pensable) ; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Hardy, 14 F. Supp. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) (Post-
master General not indispensable to suit to enjoin local postmaster from excluding letters
declared unmailable by Public Utility Holding Company Act).
43. (1937) 4 U. OF Cmi. L. Rav. 342, 344.
44. See note 1 supra. While venue is distinct from jurisdiction of the person, a
statute fixing the venue of suit in a district other than that of the defendant's residence
is held to imply power to serve extraterritorial process, for otherwise the provision would
be nugatory. Power to issue extraterritorial process was inferred from statutes provid-
ing that a national bank could sue the Comptroller of the Currency in its own district,
and restricting the place of suit by the United States on a contract bond to the plact
of performance of the contract. First Nat. Bank v. Williams, 252 U. S. 504, 510 (1920) ;
United States v. Congress Const. Co., 222 U. S. 199 (1911) ; cf. Robertson v. Railway
Labor Bd., 268 U. S. 613 (1925) ; Farmers Union Supply Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry., 25
F. Supp. 923 (N. D. Tex. 1939).
45. The Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, provides for review of wage orders
in the circuit court of appeals of the circuit in which the petitioner lives or does business.
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by indispensability into litigating in Washington is obviously great. With
the present numbers and availability of Government counsel, on the other
hand, there would be no corresponding disadvantage to the administrative
body if its superior official were joined as a party defendant in the plaintiff's
district. An alternative method of reaching the same result might be statutory
elimination of the indispensability rule by prescribing that review could be
had against subordinates above a specified rank. Besides the difficulty of
drafting a statute applicable to the varied administrative hierarchies, this
method would be undesirable unless it provided superiors with adequate
notice and opportunity to intervene when their actions were challenged through
their subordinates.46
Whether the indispensability rule is eliminated altogether, or its practical
hardships are removed by a simple procedural reform, the effect would be
freedom from a puzzling and useless hindrance to litigation. While indis-
pensability may at present serve as a convenient means of denying improper
review of administrative action, whatever accidental results it achieves in
this direction can be safeguarded by the application of other, well-understood
rules. As the principal cases show, indispensability is in itself either an un-
necessary or insufficient protection. Its elimination, by compelling courts to
rely on well-defined reasons for denying review, should help in the important
task of clarifying the relations between administrative agencies and courts.
CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC MONEY*
THE constitutions of forty-six of the United States, thirty-seven of them
by explicit reference to sectarian institutions, prohibit the appropriation of
public money to schools controlled by religious organizations. Coincidentally,
scattered across most of these states by 1937 were at least 340 Catholic
schools supported substantially by direct appropriation of public funds. The
legal and political synthesis of these disparate elements is the work of a
determined minority, frankly bent on securing from government as much
support as possible of some 7,500 Catholic elementary and secondary schools.
The techniques which are making the Catholic cause a successful one are
exemplified in a recent Indiana supreme court decision which opens the way
in that state to a wide measure of public finance for Catholic education.'
Served with notice that parochial schools enrolling some 800 students would
be unable to continue in operation, the public school authorities of Vincennes,
Indiana, entered into an arrangement with Catholic authorities involving the
52 STAT. 1065 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §210 (Supp. 1939). Orders of the NLRB may be
reviewed where the petitioner lives or does business, or where the subject matter arose.
49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(f) (Supp. 1939). Fur a collection of similar
statutory provisions see (1937) 32 ILL. L. Rav. 99, nn. 10, 11.
46. The Attorney General must in any event be notified of attacks on the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute. 50 STAT. 752 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 380a (Supp. 1939).
* State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N. E. (2d) 256 (Ind. Sup. CL 1940).
1. State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N. E. (2d) 25(1 (Ind. Sup. CL 1940).
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payment by the municipality of the salaries of Catholic instructors in return
for continued operation of the schools by the church.2 The arrangement was
challenged by a taxpayers' suit to recover on school treasurers' bonds the
salaries paid under the agreement. The Indiana constitution provides: "No
money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or
theological institution." 3
Without a dissent the court analyzed the elements involved, approved a
conclusion of law that the schools are "public" and not "parochial," and'
sustained the lower court in favor of defendants. 4 In constructing its con-
clusion that the schools are not "religious or theological institutions" the
court minimized the following facts: (1) only Catholic children attend; (2)
all teachers are members of Catholic religious orders and wear the char-
acteristic habit of their orders; (3) the crucifix, holy water, and a picture
of the Holy Family are furnished each room; (4) religious instruction, upon
which all children voluntarily attend, is given each morning for a half hour
before the official opening of school.5 On the critical issue of control, alleged
to be in the Catholic Bishop through the clerical government of the church,
the lower court made no finding of fact. The payment of salaries by the
public school board, the certification of the Catholic teachers by state au-
thorities, and the employment of a curriculum parallel to that of the public
schools were found sufficient to sustain the arrangement.0
2. Four schools were involved in the original agreement of 1933, one of them a
high school which was subsequently closed. The course of study pursued and textbooks
used were to conform to the public school curriculum. No sectarian instruction was to
be given in school hours. The buildings were furnished and maintained by the Church.
Only Catholic instructors were selected to teach in the three schools covered by the
agreement. All, however, were licensed by the state education authority.
3. IND. CoNsT., Art. I, § 6.
4. No analysis was made of quite probable benefit to an admittedly religious insti-
tution, the local Church, through continued operation of the schools without interruption
of their religious program.
5. No consideration was given to the total effect of these religious influences on the
minds of children. Each element was analyzed separately and found insufficient, by itself,
to constitute the school a Catholic school. In its discussion of judicial opinion regarding
the effect of sectarian costume on the denominational character of the school, the court
relied on Hysong v. Gallitzin School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 30 At. 482 (1894). The year
after this decision minimized the effect of sectarian costume, Pennsylvania by statute
forbade the wearing of religious costume in the schools. PuRDoW's PA. STAT. (1930)
tit. 24, §§ 1129, 1130, upheld in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 Atl. 68 (1910).
Similar statutes are in force in Oregon and Nebraska. NEBR. SCHooL LAWS (1929)
§ 79-1417; ORE. CODE (1930) § 35-2406. See O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N. Y. 421, 77
N. E. 612 (1906) (prohibiting religious costume in the schools). See also JoHNsoN4,
CHURcH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES (1934) 205-212; LIscnA, PRI-
VATE SCHOOLS AND STATE LAWS (1926) 31.
6. Since the payment of salaries by public officials is the act at issue it is difficult
to see the logic of its use as a justification for the decision: if payment is legal because
payment has been made, no question may ever be raised. A teacher's certificate, more-
over, goes only to the question of ability to teach. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) tit. 28,
§ 4207. It is irrelevant to the issue of the religious or sectarian content of the matters
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Although the Indiana decision is more sweeping in its approval of Catholic
education at public expense than that of any other court to date, the problem
with which it deals is not new to American education.7 The heterogeneous
character of American religious belief has *exercised a determinative influence
on the policy of free public instruction since the origin of truly public schools
in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.s Since education implies
philosophical orientation, control of that orientation is a consummation devout-
ly to be wished by every religious sect. The advent of education by the state
precipitated, therefore, a contest for sectarian control which attained equilib-
rium only through compromise: public education would be secular.0 Protestant
religious education retired to the church, a sprinkling of private schools sup-
ported by church groups, and the sectarian colleges. 10 But for a Catholic the
compromise was unacceptable; non-religious education is a contradiction in
Catholic terms." As a politically negligible minority in most states the
Catholic group was forced to continue its own schools, as did many Protestant
sects.12 Between 1830 and 1890, however, heavy Catholic immigration re-
dressed the balance sharply, and as early as 1840 in New York efforts were
made to obtain public funds for Catholic education.'3 The continuance of
such efforts, coinciding often with periodic waves of anti-Catholic sentiment
taught. Nor does the fact of curriculum parallel to that employed in public schools
relieve the Catholic teacher of an obligation to interpret that curriculum according to the
tenets of his faith.
7. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS (1937); Co.n'anv,
ScuCOLARism IN AERIc.x EDUCATION (1931); JoHNsozN, CHUncu-STATz RELATIoN-
SHIPS IN THE UIm STATES (1934) ; EDWARDS, THE CouRTs AND THE PUBLIC ScoLS
(1933); LIscHKA, PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND STATE LAWs (1926); BII,.LIGTo:, THE Pro-
TESTAxT CRUSADE, 1800-1860 (1938); XWILiUAuS, THE SHADOW OF THE Poi' (1932).
8. The best brief summary of the development and extent of sectarian education in
the United States is Niebuhr, Sectarian Education, 5 ENcyc. Soc. Scr. 421 ct seq. (1931).
See also GABEL, CONFREY, and JoHNsoN, op. cit. stpra note 7.
9. Niebuhr, loc. cit. mpra note 8.
10. Forty-two religious denominations other than the Roman Catholic today sup-
port private elementary schools in the United States, but 905 of such schools are Catho-
lic. The only substantial group aside from the Catholic is the Lutheran, which enrolls
67,124 pupils. Catholic elementary school enrollment is set at 1,630,120 by the latest gov-
ernment statistics. In the non-Catholic high school field only the Episcopalians today
support an appreciable number of institutions-90-although most of the other Protestant
denominations conduct a few high schools. There are 1,715 Roman Catholic secondary
schools, enrolling 197,712 students. 2 BIENxNuL SURvEY OF EDUCATION., 1934-6
(U. S. Office of Educ. 1939) passim. In the field of higher education, Protestant de-
nominations maintain 259 colleges or universities, 5 normal schools, 1 teachers' col-
lege, and 109 junior colleges. There are 134 Roman Catholic colleges, 4 teachers' col-
leges, 5 normal schools, and 39 junior colleges. EDuc. DmIcr. (U. S. Dep't of Int.
1939) 6.
11. POPE Pius XI, CHRISTIAN EDUCATION OF YOUTH (Encyclical, 1930) 24, 25,
30-1, 35-6. See LIPpIuANN, A PREFACE To MORALS (1929) 77.
12. There were at least 200 parish schools in the United States by 1840. Hagan,
Catholic Education and the Elementary School in VITAL PnoBn.EsIS oF CATnoLC EDucA-
TIoN (1939) 61.
13. Id. at 62. See also GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
(1937) 348-470.
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which swept over America between 1830 and 1928, persuaded citizens in
almost every state that the intersectarian compromise was safe only if em-
bodied in explicit constitutional provision.' 4 Amendment of those state con-
stitutions which lacked the necessary limitation closely followed the rise to
power of the first important anti-Catholic political party in 1835.Y
By 1938 only Vermont lacked at least one constitutional provision capable
of limiting the grant of public funds for Catholic, or other sectarian, educa-
tion.16 The phraseology of the provisions varies, but seven generic types are
distinguishable :17 prohibition (1) against the use of public school funds for
any purpose other than the support of common schools;18 (2) against any
grant or appropriation of money, property, or credit of the state to educa-
tional institutions not under the exclusive control of the state;19 (3) upon
the appropriation of public funds for any sectarian purpose, society, or
institution ;20 (4) denying state aid to educational institutions controlled by
14. See WIU.IAms, THE SHADOW OF THE PoPE (1932) passim.
15. Five states had constitutional provisions capable of limiting the appropriations
of public funds to Catholic-or other non-public-schools before 1840. Three more states
enacted them in the 1840's, eight between 1850-1860, six in 1860-1870, ten between 1870-
1880, seven in the decade 1880-1890, three more between 1890-1900, four more by 1911.
The other states, except Maryland and Vermont, have restrictions which indirectly limit
public funds. Maryland courts, in the absence of express constitutional restriction, decided
in 1876 that private charitable institutions, by implication of the definition of funds as
"public," are unable to share therein. St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310
(1876). Vermont, alone, lacks a constitutional provision or a judicial limitation. Pro-
visions are cited and classified at notes 18-25 infra.
16. In no provision is the Catholic church specifically named, and in no case has it
been questioned that non-Catholic denominations are equally excluded from public sup-
port. The present survey is concerned, however, only with the impact of these provisions
upon Catholic education since, as has already been suggested, sectarian schools of other
denominations are so few as to be of negligible importance, and pressure on public funds
is largely Catholic.
17. The most workable classification which has been made is that of Kindred, Public
Funds for Private and Parochial Schools (unpublished thesis in University of Michigan
Library, 1938). It has been followed below in preference to those of GAD.E, CoNfrer,
and LiscmcA, op. cit. supra note 7. An adequate compilation of state constitutions is
New York Const. Cony. Committee, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES AND UNITED STATES
(1938).
18. Constitution of: Arkansas, Art. XIV, §2; Connecticut. ArtVIII. .2; Dela-
ware, Art. X, § 4; Florida, Art. XII, § 13; Indiana, Art. -VIII, § 3; Iowa, Art. IX, par.
2, § 3; Kansas, Art. VI, § 3; Massachusetts, Amend. XLVI, §2; Nebraska, Art. VII,
§ 9; New Jersey, Art. IV, § 7, par. 6; North Carolina, Art. IX, § 4; Rhode Island, Art.
XII, § 4; South Dakota, Art. VIII, § 3; Tennessee, Art. XI, § 12; Texas, Art. VII,
§ 5; West Virginia, Art. XII, § 4.
19. Constitution of: Alabama, Art. IV, §73; California, Art. IX, §8, Art. IV,
§ 22; Colorado, Art. V, § 34; Massachusetts, Amend. XLVI, § 2; Montana, Art. V, § 35;
North Dakota, Art. VIII, § 152; Pennsylvania, Art. III, § 17; Virginia, Art. IX, § 141.
20. Constitution of: Arizona, Art. II, § 12; California, Art. IV, § 30; Colorado,
Art. V, § 34 and Art. IX, § 7; Florida, Dec. of Rights, § 6; Georgia, Art. I, § 1, par. 14;
Idaho, Art. IX, § 5; Illinois, Art. VIII, § 3; Indiana, Art. I, § 6; Louisiana, Art. IV,
§ 8; Michigan, Art. II, § 3; Minnesota, Art. I, § 16; Missouri, Art. II, § 7; Montana,
Art. V, § 35; Nevada, Art. XI, § 10; Oklahoma, Art. II, § 5; Oregon, Art. I, § 5; South
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a sectarian denomination ;21 (5) denying state aid to sectarian schools -2
(6) denying state aid to private schools ;2 (7) upon appropriations of public
money for any school in which a sectarian doctrine is taught.2 There are,
in addition, miscellaneous groups of provisions,as as well as statutes in some
of the forms suggested. 26
As a statement of publid policy the abundance of these limitations is im-
pressive. As an obstacle to the support of Catholic schools by the state it is
less so. Many arteries are left unsutured. Attempts to amend the Federal
Constitution to prevent use of public funds for schools which teach sectarian
doctrine have been successfully resisted.2 7 Appropriations for the National
Youth Administration,28 as well as certain Indian tribal and treaty funds,0
Dakota, Art. VI, § 3; Texas, Art. I, § 7; Utah, Art. I, § 4; Washington, Art. I, § 11;
Wisconsin, Art. I, § 18; Wyoming, Art. I, § 19.
21. Constitution of: California, Art. IV, §30; Colorado, Art. IX, §7; Idaho, Art.
IX, § 5; Illinois, Art. VIII, § 3; ,Missouri, Art. XI, § 11; .Montta, Art XI, § 8; New
York, Art. IX, § 4; South Carolina, Art. XI, § 9; Utah, Art. X, § 13; Washington, Art.
IX, § 4; Wyoming, Art. VII, § 8.
22. Constitution of: Alabama, Art. XIV, § 263; Arizona, Art. IX, § 10; California,
Art. IX, §8; Delaware, Art. X, §3; Florida, Art. XII, § 13; Kentucky, § 189; Louisiana,
Art. XII, § 13; Mississippi, Art. VIII, § 203; New Hampshire, Part II, Art. 83; New
Mexico, Art. XII, § 3; North Dakota, Art. VIII, § 152; Pennsylvania, Art. X, § 2;
South Dakota, Art. VIII, § 16; Texas, Art. VII, § 5.
23. These, like groups (1) and (2), do not affect sectarian schools alone and would
operate restrictively also against schools set up to foster any non-religious political or
social belief or program. See constitutions of: California, Art. IX, § 8; Louisiana, Art.
XII, § 13; Arizona, Art. IX, § 10; New Me-ico, Art. XII, § 3.
24. Constitutions of: M1assachusetts, Amend. XLVI, §2; Iinnesota, Art. VIII,
§ 3; New York, Art. IX, § 4; Nebraska, Art. VII, § 11; South Dakota, Art. VIII, § 16;
Idaho, Art. IX, § 6.
25. The constitution of South Dakota, Art. VIII, § 16, forbids acceptance by the
state of bequests for sectarian purposes. Those of Ohio, Art. VI, § 2, Kansas, Art. VI,
§ 8, and Mississippi, Art. VIII, § 208, prohibit control of educational funds by a religious
sect. See .Ez. CoNST., Art. VIII. Clauses regulating finances of state institutions in
which schools may be taught as a part of a corrective or charitable program are also
to be found. See Kindred, Public Funds for Prvate and Parochial Schools (unpub-
lished thesis in Univ. of Michigan Library, 1938) 15-18; G,'umi, Putuc Fuw:s roR
CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHooLS (1937) 537-549.
26. GABEL, loc. cit. supra note 25, found 16 states with such statutes in 1937.
27. President Grant in his message to Congress in 1875 recommended an amend-
ment forbidding the teaching of sectarian doctrines in any school supported wholly or in
part by public money. 4 CoNG. RpC. (part 1) 175, 181 (1875). James G. Blaine intro-
duced a bill to this effect and the issue became one in the campaign of 1876. The bill
failed to pass Congress. 4 CONG. Rac. (part 6) 5190, 5580, 5595 (1876).
28. WPA appropriations are also available to sectarian institutions. It may, of course,
be argued that NYA funds are an aid to the pupil, not the school; but by affording such
schools clerical and even manual labor and by placing them in a better position to com-
pete with public schools insofar as student-aid funds are concerned these grants directly
aid Catholic schools. Students in all tax-exempt private institutions are eligible for NYA
assistance. See JOHNSON AND HARVEY, TiE NATIONAL YOuTH AD l sTRATIo:z (1933)
passim.
29. In 1933 the office of Indian Affairs listed 35 private Indian Schools receiving
Federal funds, some 90% of which are operated by the Catholic Church. Jounson,
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are as a consequence available to Catholic students in Catholic schools. The
1938 Report of the President's Advisory Committee on Education recom-
mended federal aid for private institutions.3" In many state schools conducted
in orphanages, asylums, or corrective institutions are permitted public support
regardless of sectarian character.3 ' Recent legislation and judicial opinion
on the related matters of transportation and free textbooks for parochial pupils
have materially strengthened the Catholic position.32 The most extensive
subsidy allotted to the Catholic school, however, is tax exemption, available
in varying degrees in all states but California.33 Upon none of these items,
except transportation and textbooks, do the limitations in state constitutions
impinge.
Concessions in these peripheral areas, however, are insufficient, both in
philosophy and economics, to meet the Catholic demand. To only half of
some four million American Catholic children is parochial elementary school
education available.3 4 Only one out of fourteen may expect Catholic secondary
schooling.35 Meanwhile increased public expenditure for the public school,
the extension of its curriculum to vocational and custodial fields, provide a
competition for enrollment which the Catholic school, caught between expand-
ing need and declining means, finds hard to meet.3 6 Nor can the Church
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS (1934) 205. The legality of these appropriations was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50 (1908).
30. P. 54. The report was widely criticized by non-Catholics for its recommenda-
tions in this sphere. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, Proposed Public Support for Non-Public
Schools: A Serious Threat (1938) 4 SOCIAL FRONTIER 210.
31. This is true in New Haven, Conn., and in some localities in New York, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, Texas, Ohio, Illinois, California, and New
Mexico. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS (1937) 570-690.
32. Some form of free transportation was available in 1938 to Catholic school pupils
in Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,
New Hafipshire, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Kindred, Public
Funds for Private and Parochial Schools (unpublished thesis in Univ. of Michigan Li-
brary, 1938) 66-67. Textbooks are furnished to parochial pupils in Indiana, Louisiana,
and New Mexico. Id. at 81-82. Public health service for teachers and pupils of Catholic
schools was also available in 1938 in six states-Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island, Vermont. Id. at 184. Judicial opinion on these matters is collected
infra notes 53 to 55.
33. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS 'FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS (1937) 760-1. In
California only sectarian colleges are tax-exempt. CALIF. REV. AND TAX. CODE (Deer-
ing, 1939) §§ 202, 203; CALIF. CONST. Art. XIII, §§ 1, la.
34. Hagan, Catholic Education and the Elementary School in VITAL PROILEMS OF
CATHOLIC EDUCATION (1939) 67.
35. The latest Catholic survey of the high school area lists a total enrollment in 1936
of 288,864 students in 1,984 schools. NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE CONFERENCE, CATu-
OLIC COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES (1938) 55.
36. The cost of educating 21 million public schools pupils in 1930 was estimated at
about $100 per pupil. The estimated cost of Catholic education is said to be about $30
per pupil. Disregarding savings available through volunteer teaching by members of
Catholic orders the disproportion suggests a serious divergence in the quality of the
curriculum. See Newton, Educational Administration as Social Policy in REPORT OF TIE
Co-IlMISSION ON SOCIAL STUDIES, PART VIII (1934) 14; Peterson, Sursum Corda, Pao-
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conscientiously expose its members to an education increasingly oriented
toward the horizons of empirical science or social pragmatism3 7 While
publicly seeking repeal of constitutional restrictions,39 Catholics have pressed
local school boards, where possible, to compass their evasion. As the Vin-
cennes case suggests, such arrangements are not always destroyed when
challenged in the courts.
In 1937 at least 340 arrangements like that in Vincennes, involving public
support of Catholic schools, were in effect in spite of constitutional inhibi-
tion.39 Absence of adversary parties in many predominantly Catholic districts
suspends enforcement of restrictions, and even when suit is brought some
courts display a tendency, as in the Vincennes decision, to escape an unwanted
conclusion by refusing to view the situation realistically. The effectiveness
of legal challenge,.moreover, is limited by as adroit a manipulation of fictions
as judicial literature in any field has produced. The Illinois courts have
CEEDiNGS, CATH. EDuc. Ass'N CONY. (1933) 48-57. Catholics, however, criticize public
education as wasteful. See GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOWLs
(1937) 772. Catholics feel particularly keenly competition from recent development of
vocational education in public high schools. See Johnson, The Catholic School and
Secondary Education in VrrAL PROBLFmS OF CATHOLIC EDMcaTION (1939) 83.
37. The Catholic problem, and the Catholic solution therefor, are succinctly stated
by the Rev. George Johnson: "The Catholic argument is that, since the state passes laws
compelling all children to go to school, it is the duty of the state to provide schools that
accord with the dictates of the parents' conscience. The public school nmintains neutrality
with regard to religion and creed. This in itself amounts to government taking a theo-
logical position, because it implies that religion and the creed one professes have no real or
vital connection with everyday life, and that religion does not matter in the same degree
as does arithmetic, geography, or naturAl science. The philosophy of secular education
is not merely negatively but positively religious. Consequently, it stands in contradic-
tion to Catholic principles of education." The Catholic Schools in ,America (1940) 165
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 504. See CONWAY, THE QUEsTION Box (2d ed. 1929) 215.
38. Efforts were made in Ohio from 1933 to 1937 to obtain state aid for Catholic
schools. The issue became an important one in state elections in 1934, but all attempts
were unsuccessful. See JOHNSON, CHURcH-STATE RELATioxSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1934) 151-2; GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS (1937) 662-
673. The New York constitution was amended in 1938 to permit free transportation of
parochial pupils. NEv YORK CoNST. ART. IX, §4; BAI.n.wizs N-W YoR LAws SER-
vicE (June, 1940) 43. This amendment superseded the decision of Judd v. Board of
Educ. of Union Dist. No. 2, 278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. (2d) 576 (1938). The adminis-
tration of transportation in New York has since been severely criticized in the Protestant
press. See Roman Catholic Aggression on Public School Funds, (1939) 56 CH sTIAN
CENTURY 1364. For a similar campaign in the territory of Arizona, see G,%EL, op. cit.
supra, 489-90, 688-9. Public efforts in Connecticut are detailed in HEFFERNAN, A HIS-
TORY OF CATHOLIC EDUCATION IN CONNECricuT (1937) 55-74, 99-105, 132-136. These
were not entirely unsuccessful, and in New Haven, at least, certain Catholic schools
receive public support Id. at 55-73.
39. CRONIN AND DONAHUE, CATHOLIC PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1937), summarized in 45 SCHOOL AND SocIEry (1937) 756-8. Historically the system
is called "the compromise plan" by Catholic writers and was in operation as early as
1873 in Poughkeepsie, N. Y., and in communities throughout New York and some nine-
teen other states. LIscHKA, PRIvATE SCHOOLS AND STATE LAWS (1925) 207-9.
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evaded a restriction on public expenditures "in aid of any church or sectarian
purpose" by absolving of illegality all appropriations to Catholic institutions
so long as the cost of the institution's service is less than that of comparable
secular costs: "It is contrary to fact and reason to say that paying less than
the actual cost of clothing, medical care and attention, education and training
in useful arts and domestic sciences is aiding the institution where such things
are furnished." 40 A few years earlier the Illinois court had found it possible
to permit erection of a Catholic chapel on the grounds of a state institution
by viewing the transaction as a gift by the Church to the state rather than
a license of the use of land to the Church by the state.41 Difficulty is experi-
enced in selecting an appropriate legal remedy to raise the constitutional issue
in a number of cases. Mandamus to school officials suffers from its limitation
to non-discretionary acts, 42 while injunction implies prior exhaustion of less
summary remedies.43 Laches may bar equitable relief where the community
has tolerated a Catholic arrangement with the school board. 44 The United
States Supreme Court has twice avoided a square holding on the religious
issue. It found a Catholic-owned and operated hospital in the District of
Columbia non-sectarian on the ground that a corporation cannot belong to a
religious sect,46 and in the Louisiana textbook case approved the disputed
fiction that free books for parochial pupils represent a gift to the pupil, not
an aid to the school.46 New York opened a breach in its constitutional barrier
by finding that a Catholic school taught within a Catholic orphanage was
not included in the prohibition of funds to a religious "school or institution
of learning.' 4' Occasionally a case is disposed of favorably to the Catholic
position by omission to cite the constitutional limitation at all.
4 8
Of the nine judicial holdings dealing with the merits of arrangements
closely analogous to that in Vincennes, however, eight have found a violation
of the state constitution: those in Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Kansas, South Dakota, 'and Nevada.40 Only in North Dakota
40. Dunn v. Chicago Indust. School, 280 Ill. 613, 618, 117 N. E. 735, 737 (1917); cf.
County of Cook v. Chicago Indust. School for Girls, 125 Ill. 540, 18 N. E. 183 (1888).
41. Reichwald v. Catholic Bishop, 258 Ill. 44, 101 N. E. 266 (1913).
42. Scripture v. Burns, 59 Iowa 70, 12 N. W. 760 (1882); see Dorner v. School
Dist. No. 5, 137 Wis. 147, 118 N. W. 353 (1908).
43. Nance v. Johnson, 84 Tex. 401, 19 S. W. 559 (1892).
44. Dorner v. School Dist. No. 5, 137 Wis. 147, 118 N. W. 353 (1908).
45. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899).
46. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U. S. 370 (1930).
47. Sargent v. Board of Educ., 177 N. Y. 317, 69 N. E. 722 (1904).
48. Millard v. Board of Educ., 121 Ill. 297, 10 N. E. 669 (1887). The tendency to
sidestep sometimes, however, favors the anti-Catholic position. See Pronovost v. Bru-
nette, 36 N. Dak. 288, 162 N. W. 300 (1917).
49. State ex rel. Public School Dist. No. 6 v. Taylor, 122 Nebr. 454, 240 N. W.
573 (1932) ; Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 Atl. 440 (1921); Knowlton v. Baum-
hover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N. W. 202 (1918); Williams v. Stanton Dist., 173 Ky. 708,
191 S. W. 507 (1917) ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Atchison,47 Kans. 712, 28 Pac. 1000
(1892) ; Dakota Synod v. State, 2 S. Dak. 366, 50 N. W. 632 (1891); State ca: rcl. Ne-
vada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882); Jenkins- v. Inhabitants of An-
dover, 103 Mass. 94 (1869); accord, Hlebanja v. Brewe, 58 S. Dak. 351, 236 N. WV. 296
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have the courts sustained an arrangement resembling the Vincennes type in
the face of legal restriction, but there the only issue before the court was
the employment of nuns in religious garb by the public school boardYo In
addition to cases forbidding free textbooks and transportation, New York
and Oklahoma courts have handed down opinions on collateral issues which
probably preclude direct financial aid to Catholic schools.51
In some states constitutional restrictions have been lowered to the extent
that free textbooks and free transportation in school buses are available to
Catholic students. 52 The Supreme Court sustained a Louisiana interpreta-
tion of such aid as support to the pupil and not to the school,m and Maryland
has adopted tht rationale.04 All other state courts which have examinud the
issue have refused to regard it in such a light. 5 The New York constitution
has been amended to permit transportation of parochial pupils.50 A final
constitutional barrier, as yet scarcely explored by the courts with reference
to the religious issue, has arisen in Maryland to complicate the campaign
which seeks to reduce restrictions. A familiar constitutional principle forbids
appropriations of public funds to a private purpose, and though Maryland
courts have not invoked that formula to restrain expenditures for transporta-
tion of Catholic children, it has been employed to defeat appropriation to
Catholic charitable institutions.5
7
Should present constitutional provisions barring public funds to Catholic
schools be generally repealed, the courts would still be in a position to in-
validate appropriations for them on this ground. A judicial disinclination
to do so, however, is likely to be present when public opinion has been
sufficiently strong to remove express restrictions. Nor does the usual state
constitutional provision forbidding laws respecting the establishment of
(1931); Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 102 N. E. 464 (1913). See generally
Notes (1920) 5 A. L. R. 866, (1922) 20 A. L. R 1351, (1924) 31 A. L R. 1125, (192)
57 A. L. R. 195.
50. Gerhardt v. Heid, 66" N. Dak. 444, 267 N. W. 127 (1936).
51. See Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N. Y. Supp. 822 (Sup. Ct. 1925);
Connell v. Gray, 33 Okla. 591, 127 Pac. 417 (1912).
52. See note 32 supra.
53. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Educ., 281 U. S. 370 (1930), affg 163
La. 1030, 123 So. 664 (1929). On judicial treatment of books for parochial schools, see
generally Notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 299, (1930) 67 A. L. R. 1196.
54. Board of Educ. of Baltimore Co. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 At!. 628 (193);
accord, State v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 251, 176 N. W. 224 (1919) (gift to war veterans for
educational use).
55. Judd v. Board of Educ. of Union Dist. No. 2, 278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. (2d) 576
(1938) ; State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 At. 835 (1934); State cx rM.
Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N. W. 392 (1923); Smith v. Donahue, 202
App. Div. 656, 195 N. Y. Supp. 715 (3d Dep't, 1922). See Notes (1933) 51 HAnv. L
REv. 935, 37 MicH. L. Ra. 335, 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 141, 7 FoRMAnm L REv. 436,
8 Baoonax y L. REV. 90, (1939) 7 Gao. XVAsE. L. REv. 542.
56. See note 38 supra.
57. St. Mary's School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310 (1876). See (1938) 16 N. Y. U. L
Q. REv. 141, 143.
1941]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
religion present more than a casual inhibition. The effective constitutional
restraints are the explicit ones.
The chaotic condition of legal theory on the Catholic school question reflects
the confused social and political issues which underlie it. The picture is
one of concrete and explicit expression of public policy in a relatively com-
prehensive area - the state constitution - subjected to an unremitting legal
and political opposition at the hands of a well-organized and powerful minority
group. The natural judicial tendency to abjure controversial political issues
favors the status quo when challenge is offered to an allegedly illegal arrange-
ment. When the issue is squarely joined the law is clear that public support
of Catholic education in most of its forms is illegal, but the direction indicated
by the Indiana and North Dakota decisions may be significant for the future.
The possibility of change appears even less contingent when the textbook and
transportation cases are compassed.
The advent of actual religious tolerance in wide areas of the United States
has, moreover, created a receptive audience for Catholic petitions to share
the public fund to which Catholics as taxpayers must contribute. Catholic
expenditures for education save millions of dollars annually for the public
purse. The Federal Constitution may guarantee freedom of religion from
government control, but the Catholic must pay an enormous bounty to pro-
tect his children from the secular influence of the public school. The Catholic
case is not an unsubstantial one. Far short of bigotry, however, it is possible
to formulate a concrete program of objection to any extensive reduction of
the century-old intersectarian compromise. Non-Catholics are grateful for
the savings volunteered to the state through Catholic finance of Catholic
schools, but the favor is one unasked, indeed unwanted. Nor can the state
conscientiously release its funds to agencies over whose fundamental policy
it may not exercise control. 8 Acceptance of the principle implied in the
Catholic demand, moreover, entails a willingness to support with public funds
the separate schools of any legitimate religious, social, or even political group.
In a society already harassed by growing religious segregation and social
and ideological stratification, that prospect is not an inviting one.59 The
tendency of minority cultures is exemplified in recent fondness for anti-
democratic notions among some groups of the Catholic clergy, as Catholics
themselves point out ;6O the state can ill afford to level-off barriers which
hold such dangers in check. Laissez-faire in the realm of religion has been
the key to a successful American solution of the church-state problem.
Entrance of the state upon a program of religious subsidy, however benign,
58. Acceptance of public funds by Catholic schools would result in state control
over the manner in which the funds were used, and the schools would lose much of their
present independence. Consistent with Catholic opposition to the child labor amendment
on the ground that it would result in federal control of education, some Catholic leaders
have opposed acceptance of state aid by parochial schools. See 3 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
560 (1907); NATIONAL CATHOLIc ALMANAC (1941) 287-8.
59. For amplification of this view, see Kilpatrick, Proposed Public Support for Non-
Public Schools: A Serious Threat (1938) 4 SOCIAL FRONTIER 210; Johnson, Relation
of the Political State to Religion (1939) 34 RELIG. EDuc. 82; Niebuhr, Sectarian Educa-
tion, 5 ENcYc. Soc. ScL (1931) 425.
60. Shuster, The Conflict Among Catholics (1940) 10 AMER. SCHoLAR 5.
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reawakens the slumbering forces of intolerance and hate and invites them to
a contest for public support.01 The neighborhood common school, cutting
across the lines of class, sect, race, and ability is a fundamental ideal of
democratic society not lightly to be abandoned. A regard for the American
constitutional principle of religious liberty has for a hundred years exacted
of that ideal a sacrifice, and four million Catholic children are free to for-
sake the public school for the classrooms of their church. Non-Catholic citizens
are apparently willing to make further concessions in the direction of week-
day religious education.62 Beyond that area, however, lie issues to which
a democratic society dare not be indifferent.6a
FEDERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ON THE VALIDITY
OF STATE TAXES*
A FACTOR long disturbing the delicate relationship between national and
state authority was the jurisdiction of the federal courts to enjoin the assess-
ment and collection of state taxes." Even after many state legislatures, as well
61. A state subsidy for schools frankly bent on religious instruction creates, for
example, the problem of Protestant children in predominantly Catholic areas. If the only
public school is actively Catholic the child's right to an education is conditioned on acqui-
escence in sectarian instruction. For Catholic children in predominantly Protestant areas
a similar problem is raised. The essence of current compromise which excludes active
sectarianism from the schools arises from a desire to avoid this conflict, as well as that
of Protestant sects among themselves. There is, moreover, a potential Federal consti-
tutional objection. See Cantwell v. Connecticut,_3lfLL.S (19640).
62. Children were being excused from school for religious instruction in 35 states
at the time of a survey made by the Federal Office of Education in 1933, and plans of
this character date back to 1913. D.vis, WEEKDAY RELIGIOUS IxsTRucrioz. (1933)
passim. Constitutionality of the practice was upheld in New York in People ex rel. Lewis
v. Graves, 219 App. Div. 233, 219 N. Y. Supp. 189 (3d Dep't 1927), aff'd, 245 N. Y. 195,
156 N. E. 663 (1927). New York in 1940 enacted a law empowering the superintendent
of education to establish regulations for a state-wide practice involving the excuse
of children from school to receive religious instruction. New York Laws (1940), c. 305,
amending N. Y. EDUTc. LAW, Art. 23, § 625. The program has been initiated in 18 New
York City schools. Timm (Feb. 17, 1941) 39.
63. On religious liberty in the United States, see generally Hartogensis, Religious
Minorities and Non-Believers (1930) 39 Y.uE L. J. 659; Deutsch, Concept of Freedom
of Religion in American Constitutional Philosophy (1940) 28 GEo. L J. 487; Warm,
Applied Denwcracy-The Bill of Rights in Action (1940) 14 U. oF Cm;. L REv. 53,
54-83; Wright, Religious Liberty under the Constitution (1940) 27 VA. L. REv. 75;
McCullough, Religious Liberty Judicially Defined (1938) 13 Norm DA.m LwzNa 260;
Stephens, School, Church & State (1928) 12 M.Nnq. L. J. 206; Comments (1938) 14
NoTrE DA,,m LAwYER 115, 18 ORE. L. REv. 122, 36 Micu. L. REv. 485, (1915) 15 COL.
L. R.a. 704.
*Mforrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. State Board of Equalization of Wyoming, 35 F.
Supp. 553 (D. Wyo. 1940).
1. Lockwood, Mav and Rosenberry, The Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitu-
tional Litigation (1930) 43 HAv. L. REv. 426, 428, 450. See also Hughes, C. J., dissent-
ing in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 61 (1940).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
as Congress, attempted to insulate their respective revenues from intrusions
by their own judicial bodies, 2 the federal injunction remained as the classic
method for determining the validity of state taxes.3 Consequently, taxpayers
who could establish federal jurisdiction 4 were able to halt the collection of
these taxes despite state statutory requirements that payment be made prior
to litigation. But when the states adopted sales and use taxes to meet the added
expenditures necessitated by the depression,5 such interference with their
fiscal operations became intolerable and Congress passed the Act of August
21, 19376 limiting federal jurisdiction in the following respect:
" . . no district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to
enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any
tax imposed by or pursuant to the laws of any State where a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the
courts of such State."
The language of this Act is derived from its sister statute, the Johnson
Act of 19 3 4 ,7 in which Congress, by a parallel limitation on federal juris-
diction, endeavored to promote effective state regulation of public utilities.
The scope of the Johnson Act was at least temporarily limited by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the clause requiring a "plain, speedy, and efficient
remedy" in the state courts.8 But although comparable devitalization of the
2. "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court," Ray. STAT. § 3224 (1875), 26 U. S. C. § 1543 (1934).
Since it was enacted as an amendment to the Revenue Act in 1867, this statute has been
applied only to suits to enjoin federal taxes. Despite the all-inclusive language, the
courts have riddled it with exceptions. See Mooax's FEDMAL PRACTICE (1938) 204-206.
See also MIcn. Coup. LAws (1929) §3507: "No injunction shall issue to stay pro-
ceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes under this act."
3. Prior to 1937, the constitutionality of state taxes was generally tested by suits
to enjoin them in the federal courts. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167
(1939) (filed before 1937) ; Sonneborn v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506 (1923) ; Texas Co. v.
Brown, 258 U. S. 466 (1922); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921);
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
4. Large corporations easily obtained federal equity jurisdiction. As non-residents,
they invariably could establish diversity of citizenship, and their tax bills were generally
far in excess of $3000. The remedy at law in the federal courts consisted of a suit
against the state for refund and was consequently inadequate because it was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. See MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 206-208.
5. Sales and use taxes had been adopted previously in some states, but their popu-
larity increased enormously during the thirties. Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts
Taxes (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 909, 911.
6. 50 STAT. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (Supp. 1939).
7. 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §41 (1) (1934).
8. Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Montana, 299 U. S.
167 (1936) ; Corporation Comm. of Oklahoma v. Cary, 296 U. S. 452 (1935). But see
New Jersey Suburban Water Co. v. Board of Public Utility Comm'rs, 23 F. Supp. 752
(D. N. J. 1938); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Cleveland, 23 F. Supp. 965 (N. D. Ohio 1937).
For the view that the court's decisions have substantially nullified the Act, see Legis,
(1937) 50 HARV. L. Rav. 813.
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Act of August 21, 1937 might have been expected, no such result has been
forthcoming. All but one of the numerous" attempts to enjoin state taxes
after the Act became effective have failed0 because the state remedy was
found to comply with the statutory requirement.' 0 Under these decisions
actual exhaustion of state remedies is virtually required in order to determine
their adequacy. The mere possibility of a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy"
in the state courts is thus enough to forestall federal jurisdiction to enjoin
state taxes."
Finding the courts unreceptive to their pleas to enjoin state taxes, some
taxpayers resorted to declaratory judgments in an effort to obtain federal
relief from those taxes despite the Act of August 21, 1937. Mthough
federal declarations on the validity of state taxes were freely obtainable prior
to 1937,13 few of them were requested because the more familiar injunctive
9. The lone exception was the decision of a single district judge in the case of
Printers & Publishers Corp., Ltd. v. Corbett, 25 F. Supp. 369 (S. D. Cal. 1938). An
opposite result was reached by a three judge district court for the Northern District of
California a week earlier. Nevada-California Electric Co. v. Corbett, 22 F. Supp. 951
(N. D. Cal. 1938). See discussion of these cases in Note (1939) 87 U. or PA. L R-v.
615. A saving clause in the Act excluded suits commenced before August 21, 1937. 50
STAT. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (la) (b) (Supp. 1939). The case of Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Martin, 113 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) does not seem to have arisen
prior to 1937, yet the court determined the validity of the state tax without even con-
sidering the question of its jurisdiction.
10. Baker v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 106 F. (2d) 525 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U. S. 620 (1939); Brown Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. O'Hara, 32 F. Supp.
173 (AV. D. Mich. 1939); Guerra v. Philadelphia, 30 F. Supp. 791 (E. D. Pa. 1940);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Roddewig, 24 F. Supp. 321 (S. D. Iowa 1938). The case of
Phipps v. School District of Pittsburgh, 111 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) indicates
the liberal standards set for a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy." The local taxing
statute involved in that case had been held unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Litigants in plaintiff's position had previously been denied relief in the state
courts. Yet the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the state courts furnished
a remedy adequate enough to prevent federal jurisdiction.
11. Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in Kohn v. Central Distributing Co.,
306 U. S. 531 (1939) the fact that plaintiff once had a state remedy bars federal juris-
diction even though it may be unavailable when he brings the federal suit. Under the
rule evolved in the Johnson Act cases, the possibility that the state remedy might b2
inadequate justified federal jurisdiction. Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Service
Comm. of Montana, 299 U. S. 167 (1936) (utility not required to exhaust "doubtful"
state procedures). Under present interpretation of the Act of August 21, 1937, the fact
that the state remedy may be adequate prevents taxpayers from resorting to the federal
courts.
12. Since the utility companies got federal relief despite the Johnson Act of 1934
(see note 8 supra), there was no incentive for them to use the declaratory judgment in
this situation. But cf. Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Jackson, 116 F. (2d) 924 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1941) (declaratory judgment granted in controversy over contract affecting
utility rates).
13. It has been forcibly argued that the declaratory judgment meets the litigants'
needs in this situation more adequately than the injunction does. BoncrianD, DEcL.n,%-
TORY JuDGmENTs (1934) 558-9.
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remedy was also available.14 In the recent case of Morrison-Knudsen Cor-
poration v. State Board of Equdlization of Wyoming,15 a lower federal court
held that the Act forbidding it to "enjoin, suspend, or restrain" such taxes
did not deprive it of jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments on the
validity of such taxes. The Wyoming Sales and Use Taxes involved in that
case required immediate payment of the tax and provided subsequent pro-
cedure in the state courts for recovery of taxes collected illegally.' 0 Ignoring
the statutory procedure, plaintiff corporation sued in the federal district court
for a declaration that it was legally immune from tax. The court held that
the statutes were unconstitutional insofar as they made no provision for
mandatory refund of taxes improperly collected and it was thus conceivable
that some taxpayers would not be repaid even though they won judgments
for refunds in the state courts. The decision, however, was not based on a
finding that the state remedy was inadequate; the court took the position
that the Act of August 21, 1937 was inapplicable to declaratory judgments.
In support of its interpretation of the Act, the court in the Morrison case
said that Congressional failure to mention declaratory judgments in the Act
of August 21, 1937 indicated an intention to exclude them from its opera-
tion. Since Congress spoke only of federal taxes in the 1935 amendment
to the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act 17 the court inferred an intention
to treat state taxes differently. It also noted that, prior to 1935, federal courts
had given declaratory relief from federal taxes' 8 despite the venerable pro-
hibition against enjoining those taxes. 19 The court's arguments must be
qualified, however, by the fact that declaratory judgments are unfamiliar to
many legal practitioners even today, and it is quite likely that Congress never
thought about them when considering the limitation on federal jurisdiction
over state taxes. Moreover, the 1935 amendment to the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act was enacted at the insistence of the United States Treasury Depart-
ment, which was naturally interested only in facilitating the' collection of
federal taxes.
14. The only reported case is Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc., 82 F. (2d)
145 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) (plaintiff declared within exceptions allowed by Mississippi
tax statute).
15. 35 F. Supp. 553 (D. Wyo. 1940).
16. C. 102, § 1, Wyo. Laws 1937; c. 118, § 1, Wyo. Laws 1937.
17. 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. § 400 (1) (Supp. 1939). The amendment
applied to proceedings pending at the time it was passed.
18. The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act was not adopted until June, 1934.
48 STAT. 955 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 400 (1934). Between the adoption of the Act and
the exclusion of federal taxes in 1935, numerous declaratory judgments on federal
taxes were granted. Penn v. Glenn, 10 F. Supp. 483 (W. D. Ky. 1935), appeal dism'd,
84 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936); Black v. Little, 8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich.
1934) ; F. G. Vogt & Sons, Inc. v. Rothensies, 11 F. Supp. 225 (E. D. Pa. 1935). Since
the amendment to the Declaratory Judgments Act, such relief has, of course, been re-
fused. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Davis, 88 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); W. B.
Scaife & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 18 F. Supp. 748 (W. D. Pa. 1937); Union Packing Co.
v. Rogan, 17 F. Supp. 934 (S. D. Cal. 1937). Cf. Chester C. Fosgate Co. v. Kirkland,
19 F. Supp. 152 (S. D. Fla. 1937).
19. §3224 REv. STAT. (1875), 26 U. S. C. § 1543 (1934). See note 2 supra.
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Diametrically opposed to the decision in the Morrison case is the opinion
rendered several months earlier by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Collier Advertising Service, Inc. v. City of NV
York.20 Plaintiff corporation in that case sold candy bars through vending
machines located in the New York subways and questioned the application
of the New York City Sales Tax 2 ' to retail sales of such small value. In
addition to a declaration that plaintiff vendor was under no duty to collect
the tax from the vendees, an injunction was sought to prohibit the City
from collecting the tax from plaintiff. The court dismissed the bill for the
injunction on the authority of the literal provisions of the Act of August
21, 1937.22 Although the Act does not specifically forbid a declaratory judg-
- ment on state taxes, the Court reasoned that granting a declaration would
accomplish the same result as an injunction and it accordingly dismissed
plaintiff's entire bill as a matter of law.
The decision in the Collier case appears to be a sensible application of the
Act of August 21, 1937. Even though Congressional attention was focused
on federal injunctions against the collection of state taxes when the Act was
passed,23 it seems reasonable to include declaratory judgments within the
jurisdictional prohibition. Decisions in the injunction cases were frequently
deferred until long after the taxable year in question and revenue collection
was of course suspended by temporary injunctions pending adjudication. Such
interference resulted in extreme disorganization of state fiscal affairs.2-4 State
budgets are based upon a definite revenue expectation for each fiscal year,
and the anticipated taxes must be secured if government is to function ef-
fectively. Although the statute was designed to eliminate specific evils asso-
ciated with the injunction, its basic objective was to protect state revenue
systems from unwarranted obstructions imposed by the federal courts.25
Congress answered this problem by gearing federal jurisdiction to state
procedures. The decision as to whether taxpayers should be privileged to
litigate liability prior to payment of the tax was placed exclusively in the
hands of the states. States have thus been enabled to harmonize budgetary
policy with the procedural mechanism for refunding illegal taxes. If they
choose to collect all taxes and repay the illegal portion as one of the expenses
of government in the ensuing year,20 they may do so. If, on the other hand,
20. 32 F. Supp. 870 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
21. New York City Local Law No. 24 (1934) 164 (published as No. 25). See also
c. 873 New York Laws 1934.
22. Plaintiff argued that the Act applied only to state taxes and not to those levied
by municipalities. Since the New York City Sales Tax was expressly authorized by the
state legislature (see note 21 supra) there would seem to be but little question that it
was levied "pursuant to the laws" of that state.
23. See Legal Brief on S. 1551, SEzr. REP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
24. See speech by Senator Bone. 81 CoNG. Rzc. 1415 (1937).
25. See IL M R . No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). See also Note (1940)
26 VA L. REv. 374.
26. State budgets are, by nature, less flexible than those of private corporations. It
may well be that their only successful mode of operation is to collect the anticipated
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they are convinced that better policy dictates adjudication of the legality of
the tax prior to its collection,21 they may so provide. In either event, all
taxpayers will have the same remedies and there will be no discrimination
in favor of those who could establish federal jurisdiction.28
Both the situation evoking the legislation and the solution which Congress
has given would seem to compel inclusion of federal declaratory judgments
within the jurisdictional prohibition of the Act of August 21, 1937. The
Act itself indicates that, other things being equal, the state courts rather than
the federal courts should decide the validity of state taxes. The disruption
of state revenue policies follows from the federal district court's declaration
as inevitably as from its injunction. If the former relief is granted, this
result is achieved by the voluntary submission of state officials to such an
authoritative declaration.29 In the latter case they obey the court's coercive
decree, but such a difference would not seem to be material. 0 Congress
certainly intended to eliminate a practical evil rather than to abolish a form
of judicial procedure. Interpretation of the words of Congress in relation
to the evil at which they were aimed thus compels the conclusion that the
district courts have been deprived of jurisdiction to grant declaratory judg-
ments on the validity of state taxes where there is a "plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy" in the state courts.3 1
Even though the Act of August 21, 1937, were not interpreted to with-
draw jurisdiction from the court and thus require the declaratory judgment
to be denied as a matter of law, it would still be improper to grant declara-
tions on the validity of state taxes. Declaratory judgments do not issue as
amount of revenue each year regardless of how much of it will have to be subsequently
refunded.
27. Where finances are sufficiently sound to permit determination of legality prior
to collection, the expense of collecting and refunding might be saved. This saving would
not be large, however, since setoffs would be taken against taxes due in the ensuing year
instead of completing a cash refund process.
28. One of the factors causing the state resentment against federal injunctions was
the discrimination which they caused. Local citizens were forced to abide by state reme-
dies although large corporations could override them. The right to litigate tax liability
prior to payment thus depended on the fortuitous circumstance of whether federal juris-
diction existed or not, rather than upon state fiscal policy. See note 25 supra.
29. There is a natural presumption that public officials will follow the court's declara-
tion and respect its interpretation of the law. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v. City of
New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N. Y. S. 288 (1936). It has seldom been necessary
to take ancillary proceedings to enforce declaratory judgments. See BORCHARD, DECLAIA-
TORY JUDGIMIENTS (1934) 559.
30. In his opinion in the Collier case, Judge Clancy said that the result of the de-
claratory judgment would be "precisely the same" as the injunction. He concluded there-
fore that issuance of the declaratory judgment would mean "substantial nullification"
of the Act of August 21, 1937. Collier Advertising Service, Inc. v. City of New York,
32 F. Supp. 870, 871 (S. D. N. Y. 1940). See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTI E (1938) 3216.
31. It is assumed, of course, that the liberal interpretation of the "plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy" clause in the injunction cases (see note 10 supra) would be carried over
to the declaratory judgment cases.
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matters of right, but only in the sound discretion of the court.32 This does
not mean that trial courts may grant declaratory judgments whenever they
please, for their discretion has been "hardened by experience into rule" and
is reviewable on appeal.33
The rules governing judicial discretion dictate that it be exercised unfa-
vorably toward federal interference with state taxes. Before the court may
issue the declaration, it must be sure that it will not contravene public policy
or embarrass the operations of government.3 4 While the 1937 Act is admit-
tedly ambiguous with respect to declaratory judgments, it reflects unmistak-
able Congressional disapproval of federal interference in state finances. The
summary procedures traditionally used in tax collection35 evidence a deep-
rooted policy of expediting that process as much as possible. Priur to 1937.
national courts were justified in violating this basic principle because they
were required to do so in order to carry out an equally important public
policy--i.e., adjudication of certain controversies that Congress felt should
be decided in the federal courts.30 Since Congress has now abandoned this
latter policy by contracting federal jurisdiction in this sphere in order to
strengthen the former policy of protecting revenues, federal declarations
on state taxes would be unjustifiable contraventions of a well-defined policy
trend.
In addition to these legislative manifestations of public policy, the lower
federal courts should also consider expressions by the Supreme Court when
exercising their discretion relative to declaratory judgments. A unifying
thread in the recent decisions of that Court has been the abnegation of fed-
eral jurisdiction in favor of state adjudication on matters better suited to
local decision.37 There has been a pronounced insistence, for example, that
federal courts defer decisions on questions of local law and permit state
bodies to decide them wherever feasible.38 The sales and use tax cases in
which federal declaratory judgments are now being sought involve the con-
struction of complex state statutes. Even where constitutional issues are
presented, the statutes must first be construed. Since the state courts have
32. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937); Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937); Wilder v. Doe, 30 F. Supp. 869
(E. D. Pa. 1939).
33. BORCrARED, DECLARATORY JUDGMIENTS (1934) 100.
34. Id. at 111.
35. Distraint proceedings are a common example. INT. REv. Corm §§3690-3717
(1939).
36. Lower federal courts are, of course, obliged to take jurisdiction in cases and
controversies where Congress directs them to do so. The Morrison opinion clearly re-
flects the feeling that the court was duty-bound to exercise the "novel field of juris-
diction" conferred upon it by the Declaratory judgments Act. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
Inc. v. State Board of Equalization of Wyoming, 35 F. Supp. 553, 554 (D. Wyo. 1940).
37. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935); Gilchrist v. L R. T. Co.,
279 U. S. 159 (1929).
38. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940); Palmer v. Mas-
sachusetts, 308 U. S. 79 (1939); R. R. Comm. of Texas v. Roan &- Nichols Oil Co.,
310 U. S. 573 (1940). See also (1940) 50 YALE L J. 165.
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the final word on the interpretation of these statutes,8 9 and the national
courts ultimately decide the constitutional issues, 40 a well-ordered judicial
procedure demands prior determination of the underlying questions of inter-
pretation.
41
Declaratory judgments on the validity of state taxes should consequently
be dismissed by the federal courts as a matter of discretion if not as a mat-
ter of law. The issue is whether the inherent Congressional objective shall
be subordinated to the imperfectly expressed formula which was written
into law. The courts are justified in reading interlacing statutory and judi-
cial expressions of general policy as a "harmonizing text" in order to accord
"hospitable scope to Congressional purpose. ' 42  Moreover, constitutional
issues are absent, and the decision must proceed solely on the level of ascer-
taining the policy intended to be prescribed.43 Although some canons of
abstract statutory construction may point the other way, 44 the more convinc-
ing evidence of legislative intention compels national courts to refuse declara-
tory judgments in the vital realm of state taxation.
ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE 50 (b)*
RULE 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the method
by which a party may move to have an adverse jury verdict set aside and
judgment entered in accordance with his prior motion for a directed verdict.
This motion, according to the Rule, may be made separately or in conjunction
39. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 168 (1923); cf. R. R. Comm. of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4220 (U. S. 1941).
40. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816). Ultimate review of fed-
eral questions by the United States Supreme Court is not impaired by statutes limiting
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
41. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and States
Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 519. "All these difficulties would be avoided if the
road to the protection of constitutional rights lay to the Supreme Court from the state
courts. Coming thus, all state matters would be concluded, and the special local facts upon
which constitutional issues now so frequently turn would, in the first instance, be can-
vassed by judges presumably most familiar with them." See also Pogue, State Defer-
1zination of State Law under the Judicial Code (1928) 41 HA~v. L. Rzv. 623.
42. United States v. Hutcheson, 61 Sup. Ct. 463 (U. S. 1941).
43. The constitutionality of the Johnson Act of 1934 was sustained in the case of
Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Jackson, 9 F. Supp. 564 (S. D. Miss. 1935). Al-
though Article III of the Constitution authorizes Congress to create inferior federal
courts, it does not compel their establishment. By the same token, Congress may with-
draw jurisdiction previously conferred on the district courts. Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922). Constitutional objections were raised by Congressman Beck,
however, during the course of the debates on the Johnson Act. See 78 CoNG. Rac. 8332
(1934).
44. Those relied on by the court in the Morrison case. See note 17 supra.
* Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 61 Sup. Ct. 189 (U. S. 1940).
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with an alternative prayer for new trial.1 While comparable devices for chal-
lenging the legal sufficiency of evidence were not unknown at common law2
or in early federal practice, 3 the federal courts, prior to this Rule, had in
most states only restricted powers to delay decision upon the sufficiency
of evidence until a verdict had been returned by the jury. In states which
had by statute expressly extended the common law motion for judgment
non obstante veredicto, however, federal courts had by virtue of the Con-
formity Act 4 utilized this convenient method of correcting an earlier hasty
denial of a motion for directed verdict.5 But recourse to this device was curbed
by the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in SlocunL v. New York Life Inssurance
Co., holding the statutory judgment non obstantc veredicto unconstitutional
as a deprivation of the litigant's right to trial by jury under the Seventh
Amendment. 6 Only after a period during which wholesale resort to new
1. Rule 50(b), Fa. RuLEs Civ. PRoc., provides: "Whenever a motion for a di-
rected verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not
granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later
determination of the legal questions raised by the motion . . . A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If
a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the
judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed."
2. At common law, the legal sufficiency of the evidence was challenged by a motion
for directed verdict or by a demurrer to the evidence. There %vas, however, this import-
ant distinction between the two devices: a party demurring to the evidence lost his oppor-
tunity to go to the jury in case his demurrer was overruled [Gibson v. Hunter, 2 BI.
H. 187, 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (H. of L. 1793) ; Wright v. Pindar, Aleyn 18, 82 Eng. Rep.
892 (K. B. 1647)], while a party moving for a directed verdict and losing mas, neverthe-
less, entitled to have the case submitted to the jury. Mead v. Robinson, Barnes 451, 94
Eng. Rep. 999 (C. P. 1744). With the consent of the jury and of the parties litigant,
courts frequently reserved rulings on motions for directed verdict until a verdict had
been returned by the jury. Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345, 97 Eng. Rep. 866 (K. B.
1762); Coppendale v. Bridgen, 2 Burr. 814, 97 Eng. Rep. 576 (K. B. 1759). See also
THAYER, PRELImiNARY TREATISE oN EvIDENCE (1898) 241.
3. The practice of demurring to the evidence was recognized in federal courts dur-
ing their early history. Chinoweth v. Lessee of Haskell, 3 Pet. 92 (U. S. 1830); United
States Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171 (U. S. 1826); Pawling v. United States, 4 Cranch
219 (U. S. 1808). Demurring to the evidence, however, proved a cumbersome device ior
challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence, and was soon replaced by the motion
for directed verdict. Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 362 (U. S. 1850).
4. The Conformity Act required federal courts to conform "as near as may he" to
the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding enisting in the courts of the
state within which the trial was held. 17 STAT. 197 (1872), 28 U. S. C. § 7-4 (1934).
5. At common law, the motion for judgment nion obsiantc vercdilclo could be made
only by the plaintiff; it challenged only the sufficiency of the record, not the evidence.
Minnesota was the first state to broaden the scope of the common law motion to include
the evidence at the trial. MINx. GEN. LAws (1895) c. 320, 2 MINN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 9495. All but eleven states now have similar statutes. See Comment (1935)
34 MIcH. L. REv. 93, 94 n. 4, 6.
6. 228 U. S. 364 (1913). The decision of the majority wvas severely criticized bath
by the dissenting justices and by legal writers. Thorndike, Trial b, Jury in United States
Courts (1913) 26 HARV. L. REv. 732; Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Citil Pro-
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trials proved an eminently unsatisfactory substitute 7 did the Supreme Court
relax this holding and permit the effect of a judgment non obstanie veredicto
to be achieved by the trial judge expressly reserving action on the motion for
directed verdict until an adverse jury verdict had been returned.8
By prescribing an automatic reservation of the ruling upon a motion for
directed verdict, Rule 50(b) follows the pattern sanctioned by the Court in
Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman 9 and thus circumvents the constitu-
tional hurdle which the Court unnecessarily erected barring judgments non
obstante veredicto.10 But while the Rule is explicit in enabling the trial judge
to render more carefully deliberated rulings and thus avoid needless retrials,
it fails to specify how the trial judge should dispose of alternative motions
and how the appellate court should proceed in reviewing this action.
Several cases have arisen under Rule 50(b) wherein, after denial of a
motion for directed verdict made at the close of the testimony, alternative
motions for a directed verdict and for a new trial were duly made within
the prescribed ten days after return of an adverse verdict, and the reserved
motion for directed verdict was sustained." The trial judges in these cases
uniformly followed the general state practice of refusing to pass upon the
motion for new trial until final appellate action, if any, was taken upon the
cedure (1918) 31 HAav. L. REV. 669, 685; Thayer, Judicial Adininistration (1915) 63
U. OF PA. L. RIv. 585, 600.
7. The practice of remedying a previous incorrect ruling by a new trial "submits
the aggrieved party to the delay, annoyance, and cost of relitigation which will undoubt-
edly end in his favor anyhow if the memories of witnesses have not become dulled by the
passage of time." Comment (1935) 34 MicH. L. REv. 93. For this reason, federal dourts
followed the rule of the Slocum case reluctantly. See SimxmNs, FDERAL PacTcE
(rev. ed. 1934) § 198.
8. The Court first departed from the Slocun, doctrine without comment in Northern
Ry. v. Page, 274 U. S. 65 (1927). The doctrine was substantially altered in Baltimore
& Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654 (1935), and was, in effect, overruled when
the Supreme Court construed the statute involved in the Slocum case to be valid where
action upon the motion was properly reserved. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U. S.
389 (1937).
9. 295 U. S. 654 (1935).
10. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who had earlier enunciated the Slocum doctrine, also
wrote the decision in the Rednian case. His attempt to distinguish the two decisions on
grounds that only a question of law was presented in the latter case and that the parties
might be deemed to have consented to the reservation, is hardly convincing in view of
the fact that precisely the same question-the legal sufficiency of the evidence-was
involved in both cases. Furthermore, the inferable consent argument was equally applica-
ble to the former case, had the court then been willing to accept it. The automatic res-
ervation provided by Rule 50(b), however, precludes further entanglement with these
problems. See 3 MooRE, FED.AL PRAcrimc (1938) 3102 et seq.
11. Churchill v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 2 FEx. RULES SERv. 50b. 31, Case I (W. D.
Pa. 1939); Bachner v. Eickhoff & Co., 27 F. Supp. 105 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Duncan v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 27 F. Supp. 4 (E. D. Ark. 1939); Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v.
American Fid. & Cas. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808 (E. D. S. C. 1939); Pessagno v. Euclid Inv.
Co., 25 F. Supp. 896 (D. D. C. 1939). For other cases in which the district courts have
granted the reserved motion for directed verdict in unreported opinions, see note 13 hi ra.
[Vol. 50936
judgment entered for the moving party." This course was justified on the
theory that if the judgment is not appealed or is affirmed upon appeal, any
ruling upon the new trial motion would prove superfluous as well as incon-
sistent with the previous determination. Furthermore, a trial judge, if reversed
upon appeal, is better qualified to rule correctly on the new trial motion after
he has been apprised by the appellate court as to the proper weight to be
accorded the particular evidence.
Appellate courts, however, in reversing the judgments in four of these cases,
have rendered conflicting interpretations of the practice contemplated under
Rule 50(b). While three circuit courts of appeal have reinstated the verdict
and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the motion
for new trial,' 3 the Eighth Circuit Court1 4 construed the trial judge's granting
of the alternative motion for directed verdict as "equivalent to a denial of the
motion for new trial," causing the latter motion to "pass out of the case upon
entry of the [former] order."15 On the basis of this determination,'0 the
circuit court entered final judgment on the verdict. The palpable injustice
of depriving a litigant who follows the procedure prescribed by Rule 50(b)
of a determination of his new trial motion induced the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in this case' 7 and to promulgate a uniform practice for deal-
ing with alternative motions. Although remanding this case to the district
court for a hearing upon the new trial motion, the Court determined that in
the future trial judges are to pass upon both motions at the same time, ir-
respective of their rulings on the reserved motion for directed verdict.18
12. Estate of Caldwell, 216 Cal. 694, 16 P. (2d) 139 (1932); Daniels v. Butler,
175 Iowa 439, 155 N. W. 1013 (1916) ; In re Cummins' Estate, 271 Mich. 215, 259 N. W.
894 (1935) ; Jones v. Chicago St. P. 16f. & 0. Ry., 80 Minn. 488, 83 N. W. 446 (19b0);
Fisk v. Henarie, 15 Ore. 89, 13 Pac. 760 (1887) ; Osche v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32-4
Pa. 1, 187 Ati. 396 (1936) ; Fagerdahl v. North Coast Transp. Co., 178 Wash. 482, 35 P.
(2d) 46 (1934) ; cf. Sulzbacher v. Continental Casualty Co., 88 F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A.
8th, 1937).
13. Vearn v. Crane, 114 F. (2d) 896 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ; Pessagno v. Euclid Inv.
Co., 112 F. (2d) 577 (App. D. C. 1940); Pruitt v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 112 F. (2d) 140 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
14. Duncan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 108 F. (2d) 84S (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
15. While the Eighth Circuit Court failed to cite supporting cases for its position,
it was not completely without authority. See Spruce v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 139
Okla. 123, 281 Pac. 586 (1929); cf. Kauders v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 299 Ill. App.
152 (1939) ; Jenkins v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 186 S. C. 518, 197 S. E. 28 (193S). But the
case of Luse v. Union Pac. Ry., 57 Kan. 361, 46 Pac. 76S (1S96), upon which plaintiff
in the principal case relied, though containing dictum that the appellate court should
grant final judgment for appellant, actually was ordered back to the lower court for a
new trial.
16. The circuit court of appeals placed considerable emphasis on the unfortunate
phraseology of the defendant's alternative motion. Its holding, however, was couched in
general language equally applicable to any alternative motion. See 3 Mloon, FUaaMa.
PRAcnc (Supp. 1940) 3111.
17. -Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 309 U. S. 650 (1940).
18. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 61 Sup. Ct. 189 (1940), (1941) 29 C.txtm.
L. REv. 247, 54 HAuv. L. REv. 694. This practice was suggested in Simumii s, Fvzc.%u
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The Supreme Court has thus adopted what would seem the obvious
solution for expediting litigation. The approved practice not only assures a
decision on the second motion while the evidence is fresh in the trial judge's
mind, but enables the appellate court to review on the same appeal both the
alleged grounds for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the alleged
errors of law committed during trial. The ramifications of this practice,
however, became apparent only upon a consideration of the various combina-
tions of rulings that may be rendered upon the alternative motions.
Existing procedure is unmodified where the trial court denies both the
reserved motion for directed verdict and the motion for new trial.19 Judg-
ment will be entered on the verdict, and the losing party may of course appeal,
assigning as errors both the denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and errors of law in the trial.20 The appellate court may then either affirm
the judgment or reverse it and enter judgment for appellant notwithstanding
the verdict, or remand the case for a new trial.2 1 The sole effect that Rule
50(b) has upon previous federal practice in this situation is to endow the
appellate court with power to enter final judgment for the appellant. 22
Where the trial court grants both the reserved motion for directed verdict
and the motion for new trial, an appeal may be taken from the judgment
entered. While the appellate court may reverse this judgment, the case,
instead of being remanded for consideration of the new trial motion, will be
governed under the new practice by the order of the lower court granting
new trial, since such orders are ordinarily not reviewable.23 For the same
reason, if the trial court denies the reserved motion for directed verdict and
grants the motion for new trial, the party favored by the jury verdict will
be precluded from an appeal. The movant, likewise, will probably be refused
PRACTICE (3d ed. 1938) § 702. Michigan and Wisconsin apparently follow a similar pro-
cedure. Peters v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 426, 276 N. W. 504 (1937); Tomberlin
v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., 211 Wis. 144, 246 N. W. 571 (1933).
19. Sampson v. Channell, 27 F. Supp. 213, 215 (D. Mass. 1939).
20. The question is still unsettled whether an appellate court may, under Rule 50 (b),
order judgment for the appellant where the appellant has failed to renew its motion for
directed verdict after the jury has returned an adverse verdict. In two recent cases, the
Second Circuit Court held the renewal of the motions unnecessary, but the Supreme
Court in reviewing this action reversed the cases on the merits without considering the
procedural problem under Rule 50 (b). Berry v. United States, 111 F. (2d) 615 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1940), rev'd, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4227 (U. S. 1941); Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.
(2d) 611 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), rezd, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4227 (U. S. 1941). See also
United States v. Halliday, 116 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
21. Southern Ry. v. Bell, 114 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); Williams v. New
Jersey-New York Transit Co., 113 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Ferro Concrete
Constr. Co. v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Reliance Life Ins.
Co. v. Burgess, 112 F. (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); Lowden v. Denton, 110 F. (2d)
274 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) ; Massachusetts Prot. Ass'n v. Mouber, 110 F. (2d) 203 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1940).
22. See SimiiNs, FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 1938) § 637.
23. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Heck, 102 U. S. 120 (1880) ; Paine v. St. Paul
Union Stockyards Co., 28 F. (2d) 463 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; cf. Fairmount Glass Works
v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U. S. 474 (1933); Hayden v. Johnson, 59 Ga. 104 (1877).
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an appeal from the order denying his reserved motion for directed verdict
on grounds that this order does not represent a final adjudication of the
cause, that he has gained the relief sought, and that he may move for a
directed verdict in the new trial.24 Granting an appeal to the movant at this
point might conceivably render retrial unnecessary, at least in cases where
the new trial was granted because the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence.2 5 In most cases, however,-and particularly where the new trial
was predicated upon other grounds 26 -the appellate court would probably
be reluctant to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the right to
appeal would prove illusory.
The new practice enunciated by the Supreme Court is primarily significant
where the trial court grants the reserved motion for directed verdict and denies
the new trial motion.2 7 If the party winning the jury verdict appeals from
this judgment on the motion, the opposing party should cross-appeal and
assign error to any rulings of law at the trial; upon possible reversal of the
trial court's judgment on the motion, the appellate court may then pass upon
the alleged errors of law which might require a new trial. 8
In practice, however, this combination of rulings is likely to prove hypo-
thetical. A trial judge, convinced that the evidence is of such conclusive
character that a verdict must be directed as a matter of law, would not seem
likely to reverse his position and make the findings requisite for a denial of
the new trial motion - namely, that the weight of the evidence supports
the verdict.29 The theory that the trial judge will enter a mental vacuum
24. Minnesota courts deny the moving party an appeal at this point under a statute
which closely resembles Rule 50(b). Drcha v. Great N. Ry., 178 Minn. 286, 226 N. NV.
846 (1929); St. Anthony Falls Bank v. Graham, 67 Minn. 318, 69 N. W. 1077 (1897).
But see Michigan-Ohio-Indiana Coal Ass'n v. Nigh, 131 Ohio St. 405, 3 N. . (2d)
355 (1936), 4 U. oF CHL L. REv. 153.
25. Where a new trial is sought on grounds that the verdict is against the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the question presented to the court differs only in degree
from that posed by a reserved motion for directed verdict. In the former instance, the
trial judge has discretion to set aside the verdict if he believes the verdict opposes the
weight of the evidence. In the latter case, he may only grant the motion for directed
verdict if he finds no substantial evidence in support of the verdict returned. Federal
courts, however, require more than a scintilla of evidence to preclude the direction of a
verdict. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U. S. 248 (1925); Jones v. Travelers' Prot.
Ass'n, 70 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
26. Other grounds upon which new trials have been granted include prejudicial
misconduct of counsel [Chadwick v. United States, 141 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905)],
bias of a juror [Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 15 F. Supp.
379 (f. D. Mo. 1936)], improper and prejudicial rulings upon the admissibility of
evidence [Keliher v. United States, 193 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912)], erroneous instruc-
tions to the jury [United States v. Bergdoll, 272 Fed. 498 (E. D. Pa. 1921)], excessive
damages [Jacoby v. Johnson, 120 Fed. 487 (C. C. A. 3d, 1903)], newly-discovered evi-
dence [Knowlton v. Seneca Eng. Co., 36 F. (2d) 394 (V. D. N. Y. 1929)].
27. See 3 FED. Rutras Smzv., Commentary 50b. 211.
28. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 61 Sup. Ct. 189, 195 (1940); cf. Peters
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 426, 276 N. W. 504 (1937).
29. In order to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a trial judge must find
that there are no controverted issues upon which reasonable men could differ. This re-
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and render a decision of the motion for new trial entirely unaffected by his
previous determination seems highly unrealistic. The necessity of ruling upon
the two motions at once would seem more likely to induce the trial judge
to adopt one of two courses. He might grant both the motions for directed
verdict and for new trial automatically whenever he deems a directed verdict
appropriate. a0 Or he might grant a new trial and deny the motion for directed
verdict, thus giving another jury an opportunity to arrive at the proper verdict,
and at the same time avoiding the risk of an appellate reversal. Either of
these courses would increase the number of new trials over that which might
have resulted had the Court adopted the general state practice under which
the trial judge reserves action on the motion for new trial until final appellate
action has been taken on the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.8 ' After
the trial judge has been reversed upon appeal, the determination of the motion
for new trial loses its previous hypothetical character, and presents a con-
crete problem.
The experience in state practice indicates a stronger reluctance on the
part of trial judges to grant new trials after reversal of their previous order
than is likely to obtain under the procedure recently sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. Under state practice, appellate courts in reversing judgments not-
withstanding the verdict, generally indicate the weight properly attributable
to the specific evidence in the case. Trial judges are thus enabled to render
an order on the new trial motion in conformity with the appellate court's
view of the evidence, and fewer new trials are likely to result than if the
motion for new trial were ruled on prior to reversal. In fact, trial judges
have occasionally been unduly reluctant to grant new trials after reversal,
and their denials of the new trial motion have subsequently been reversed
upon appeal.32 Federal procedure, however, does not afford the safeguard
of an appellate review of the trial court's action upon the motion for new
trial, except in the rare case where the trial judge has clearly abused his dis-
cretion. 33 Consequently the practice under Rule 50(b) present a dilemma.
quires a far greater degree of conviction than is requisite to justify ordering a new trial.
Upon granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a finding that the verdict is against
the preponderance of the evidence would seem to follow as a matter of course. If the
trial court, however, predicates its judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon a conclu-
sion of law and not upon the insufficiency of the evidence, an occasion arises in which
the trial judge would deny the motion for new trial. See Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
104 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
30. In the one case reported since the Supreme Court's decision in the Duncan case
the trial judge adopted this course. Bopst v. Columbia Cas. Co., 4 FED. RUL s SE v.
50b. 211, Case 2 (D. Md. 1940). The trial judge stated, "In this case I find it proper
to grant the motion for new trial as well as the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in accordance with the practice outlined in the Montgomery Ward case. My
principal reason for granting a new trial is that the verdict of the jury, I think, is defi-
nitely contrary to the very considerable weight of the evidence."
31. See cases cited supra note 12.
32. See Linker v. Union Pac. Ry., 87 Kans. 186, 123 Pac. 745 (1912); Fohl v. Chli-
cago & N. W. Ry., 84 Minn. 314, 87 N. W. 919 (1901) ; cf. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v.
Dimick, 96 Il. 42 (1880).
33. Sultzbacher v. Continental Casualty Co., 88 F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);
cf. Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U. S. 474 (1933).
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If the Supreme Court had adopted the state practice, no adequate protection
would have been afforded litigants against unjustified denials of the motion
for new trial.34 Yet the procedure approved by the Supreme Court seems
likely to increase the granting of new trials in contravention of the purpose
explicit in Rule 50(b) - namely, to curb needless relitigation.
Possibly the most expedient practice in the case of alternative motions
would be for the trial court to abdicate its power to make primary determina-
tions of the propriety of a new trial, by rendering an arbitrary denial of the
motion for new trial. The party favored by the jury could then appeal from
the order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the movant
could cross-appeal the alleged errors at the trial. This course would enable
the appellate court, in the event of reversal of the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, to rule on the alleged errors at the trial, and would avoid retrials
which the appellate court deemed unnecessary.3 5 Adoption of this practice
would be consistent with the existing scope of appellate review in federal
courts.
BANK NIGHT AND SIMILAR DEVICES AS ILLEGAL LOTTERIES*
A FAvoniTE merchandising device, especially during depression periods,
has been the lottery, dressed in the guise of Bank Night1 or some scheme
of similar nature.2 Appealing to the gambling and sporting instincts of the
consumer, rather than to his sense of merchandise quality, these schemes
are likely to run afoul of universal state legislation outlawing the lottery.3
34. The federal trial judge reversed in Pessagno v. Euclid Ins. Co., 112 F. (2d)
577 (App. D. C. 1940), is reported by the clerk to have denied the motion for new trial
on Nov. 4, 1940. The case of Pruitt v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 112 F.
(2d) 140 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), however, was settled on August 23, 1940, prior to action
on the motion for new trial.
35. The circuit court of appeals in the Duncan case, after construing the trial judge's
action as a denial of the motion for new trial, might readily have achieved this result,
had it reviewed appellee's contentions for a new trial, instead of holding that the motion
had "passed out of the case."
1. This scheme, designed to increase the attendance at motion picture theaters,
has been promoted by Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., a Colorado corporation chartered in
1933. See Affiliated Enterprises. Inc. v. Gantz, 86 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935);
Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3 (N. D. Ill. 1937).
2. Merchandising schemes found at one time or another to be lotteries include the
"break and take" candy package, finter v. Federal Trade Comm., 102 F. (2d) 69
(C. C. A. 3d, 1939); the punchboard scheme for selling candy, Helen Ardelle, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Comm., 101 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) ; and the suit club, People
v. Hecht, 119 Cal. App. (Supp.) 778, 3 P. (2d) 399 (1931). The early success of
Bank Night encouraged the promotion of several schemes connected with theaters, not
the least of which is "Screeno." United-Detroit Theatres Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical
Enterprise, 280 Mich. 425, 273 N.W. 756 (1937).
3. All forty-eight states have statutes dealing with lotteries, three-quarters of
them having constitutional provisions as well. Federal legislation renders matters con-
cerning lotteries unmailable and forbids the radio broadcasting of information concern-
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Few of these statutes describe the device which is outlawed. 4 That task has
been left to the courts, which have generally defined the lottery as a scheme
in which a chance for a prize has been given in return for a consideration.
Unless all three elements - prize, chance, and consideration - are found to
be present, the device is not a lottery.5 Because evaders can easily eliminate
from their schemes any particular type of consideration seized upon by the
courts in earjier devices, the consideration requirement, included in the defini-
tion when the word "lottery" connoted only a scheme in which lottery tickets
were sold for a definite price, has in recent years plagued courts applying the
statutes.
There are three types of schemes in which prize and chance concur: the
closed-participation device, in which every participant must give up some
valuable consideration in connection with the scheme, though in actuality,
perhaps not directly for the chance ;O the flexible-participation device, of which
Bank Night is an example, in which some give up a consideration, but others
do not;7 and the open-participation, in which none of the participants parts
with a consideration. The last is always legal, s the first, almost never. The
flexible-participation scheme, on the other hand, partaking of the qualities
of both of the others, has for a half-century been the subject of a formidable
judicial schism.9 In some jurisdictions it has been held legal, for lack of
consideration, 10 but in the majority of states it has been thrown out of court
ing them. See WILLIAMS, FLEXIBLE-PARTICIPATION LorriEs (1st ed. 1938) 31-77;
Pickett, Contests and the Lottery Laws (1932) 45 HARv. L. Rav. 1196.
4. There are three general types of anti-lottery statutes: (a) those prohibiting
a "lottery," and defining it as a scheme in which a valuable consideration is given for
a chance, CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1937) §319; (b) those prohibiting a "lottery,"
but not defining it, 18 PA. STAT. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 18, §4601; and (c) those
prohibiting "gift enterprises" or "schemes of chance" as well as "lotteries," ALA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 4247. In some states, some lotteries are exempted if the proceeds
go to charity. See Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 293 Mass. 459, 200 N. E. 269 (1936).
5. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 101-107, and cases cited there; Horner v.
United States, 147 U. S. 449, 458 (1893).
6. Pickett, supra note 3, at 1206-7. See cases cited in Commonwealth v. Lund,
15 A. (2d) 839, 843 (Pa. 1940). It was the intransigent objection to the existence of
payment as a condition precedent to participation that led to the formulation of flexible-
participation schemes.
7. Under the flexible-participation scheme any person is given a free chance if
he complies with certain conditions, none of which involves thd payment of money.
But those who purchase the merchandise or attend the theater are also given a chance,
without having to comply with the conditions. And the conditions hedging the free
chance are generally made so onerous as to exert a pressure on the public to buy in
order to avoid the necessity for compliance. See Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Waller,
5 A. (2d) 257 (Super. Ct. Dela. 1939).
8. See Willis v. Young [1907] 1 K. B. 448; Commonwealth v. Wall, 295 Mass.
70, 3 N. E. (2d) 28 (1936).
9. The tvo leading cases are Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338
(1890) (legal) and Willis v. Young [1907] 1 K. B. 448 (illegal).
10. At present, Iowa, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and
Tennessee legalize Bank Night, and California, Colorado and South Carolina, which
have not passed on the scheme itself, have approved other flexible-participation devices.
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on one or another of five grounds,"1 four of which involve the finding of the
"consideration" necessary to make it a "lottery."
Perhaps the best-known example of the flexible-participation lottery is
theater-sponsored Bank Night; in the past half-decade the development of
lottery law has been furthered almost exclusively by cases involving this
particular device. Under the ordinary rules of its operation, 12 the public
registers free of charge, the winning number being chosen by lot from among
the registrants, but those who do not pay to enter the theater are required
to claim the prize within two or three minutes after the name of the winner
is announced outside. Participants are thus forced to purchase a ticket of
admission, or else stand outside of the theater, if they are not to forfeit their
chances.
The crudest of the rationales directed toward judicial control of Bank
Night held the so-called "free participation," made possible by the registra-
tion system, to be illusory.13 As a practical matter, said the courts, everyone
bought a theater ticket, although free chances were theoretically available, and
in its practical operation the scheme appeared to be the illegal closed lottery
in disguise. This particular view had, however, been worked out in the
pre-Bank Night era for the control of less artfully constructed flexible-par-
ticipation schemes,'- and the Bank Night device was carefully designed to
make its application unrealistic.1 The large measure of free participation
in Bank Night was too apparent to be ignored, and treatment of the free
chance as a subterfuge gave way to a more sophisticated reasoning which
recognized the undeniably novel problems introduced by free registration.
Thus a second general rationale evolved as an adaptation of the closed-
participation rule. The scheme was deemed a lottery if a great majority of
those buying the merchandise or attending the theater paid in part for a
chance to win the prize,' thus giving a valuable consideration for it." Of
11. Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Te-xas, Vermont, and Wisconsin have ruled against Bank Night. Michigan,
Virginia, and Washington have outlawed other flexible-participation lotteries.
12. See WLLmaxs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 109.
13. Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gantz, 56 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936); see
City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 129 Tex. 40, 100 S. W. (2d) 695 (1936).
14. State v. Danz, 140 Wash. 546, 250 Pac. 37 (1926); Glover v. Malloska, 238
Mich. 216, 213 N. W. 107 (1927); Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n,
10 S. IV. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
15. In State v. Dan , a pre-Bank Night case, supra note 14, no one had actually
taken a free chance, although they were available. This was not the case in the Bank
Night schemes. See, for instance, General Theatres, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dis-
tributing Corp., 9 F. Supp. 546 (D. Colo. 1935).
16. This doctrine seems to have been laid down first in Central States Theatre
Corp. v. Patz, 11 F. Supp. 566 (S. D. Iowa 1935), where the plan required that only
a few pay for the chance. It was then adopted in the early cases legalizing Bank Night,
which stated that a great majority must pay. State v. Eames, 37 N. H. 477, 133 At.
590 (1936); State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. IV. 603 (1936). Recently, the
'rule has been phrased according to its original requirement. McFadden v. Bain, 162
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course, since the chances were given away to customers and non-customers
alike, it could not very well be argued that the customers were paying partly
for a chance they could have obtained for nothing. To meet this objection,
several of the courts pointed out that the customer received a better chance18
- he was comfortably seated out of the weather and jostling crowd, he was
nearer to the stage and thus did not have to fear the brief time-limit for self-
identification, and he was not, in claiming the prize, subject to the psychologi-
cal inhibitions and embarrassments besetting one who had waited outside.
The portion of the admission price paid by theafer patrons for this "better
chance" constituted a valuable consideration moving from the participants.
Though paid by only a part of the participants, it was sufficient to make the
scheme a lottery.19 Because of the emphasis laid by different courts on dif-
ferent steps of this rationale, it has variously been termed as the "mass con-
sideration," "valuable consideration," or "better chance" theory. It is par-
ticularly vulnerable at the point of "better chance," a fact soon recognized
by theater-owners operating Bank Night, for if the restrictions on outside
participation are substantially removed, it cannot be argued that the cus-
tomers are paying partly for a chance. 20 Thus the facts of each individual
case are often very important. The absence of the irksome requirement that
free participants be present at the time of the drawing, has proved conclusive
in absolving the operator,21 as has a marked lengthening of the time-limit
Ore. 250, 91 P. (2d) 292 (1939) ; see Commonwealth v. Wall, 295 Mass. 70, 73, 3 N. E.
(2d) 28, 30 (1936).
17. The valuable consideration rule originated before the invention of Bank Night
[People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, 28 P. (2d) 99 (1933)], but its greatest
development came in the early cases favorable to the scheme. People v. Shafer, 160
Misc. 174, 289 N.Y. Supp. 649 (1936), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 475, 6 N. E. (2d) 410 (1936),
16 OmE. L. REv. 97, 3 U. oF PiTT. L. REv. 67.
18. Foreshadowed in Commonwealth v. Wall, 295 Mass. 70, 3 N. E. (2d) 28 (1936),
the "better chance" rule was first advanced as an independent ground for decision in
City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 129 Tex. 40, 100 S. W. (2d) 695 (1936) and
Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N. E. (2d) 648 (1937).
19. This phase of the rationale, invented in England [Willis v. Young (1907) 1 K. B.
448], has been called the "mass consideration" rule. Central States Theatre Corp. v.
Patz, 11 F. Supp. 566 (S. D. Iowa 1935) ; Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 I11. 256,
8 N. E. (2d) 648 (1937) ; Barker v. State, 56 Ga. App. 705, 193 S. E. 605 (1937). A
further development of the mass consideration rule points out that the admission prices
must be the consideration for all participants because they are the only source from
which the prize can be created. Jones v. Smith Oil & Refining Co., 295 Ill. App. 519,
15 N. E. (2d) 42 (1938); State ex rel. Dussault v. Fox Missoula Theatre Corp., 101
P. (2d) 1065 (Mont. 1940). But cf. State v. Danz, 140 Wash. 546, 250 Pac. 37 (1926)
(prizes donated to operators by third parties).
20. See People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, 28 P. (2d) 99 (1933);
People v. Psallis, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 796 (City Mag. Ct. N. Y. 1939).
21. Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338 (1890) ; Cross v. People,
18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821 (1893); Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190 S. C. 282,
2 S. E. (2d) 782 (1939). But cf. State ex rel. Dussault v. Fox Missoula Theatre Corp.,
101 P. (2d) 1065 (Mont. 1940); State ex rel. Regez v. Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 294
N. W. 491 (1940).
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within which the prize may be claimed,m since there is in such cases no real
disadvantage connected with the "outsider's" chance.
On the other hand, so-called "matinee registration" schemes, by which
those attending in the afternoon may sign proxy slips obviating the necessity
for their presence at the Bank Night drawing in the evening, are sometimes
seized upon as clear indications that part of the matinee admission price,
at least, is paid for a "better chance."23 And the absence of a fixed time for
the drawing, forcing the outsider to wait for a long wlile in the street, may
constitute important evidence of the undesirability of the "free" chance.2 4
Similarly adverse to legality may be a marked increase in attendance on
Bank Night,25 or a large percentage of paying participants as opposed to
non-paying.26
In many cases, where "free" participation is made relatively attractive,
it has been clear that the scheme benefited the merchant or theater-owner, and
excited the gambling instincts of the public, but not at all clear, especially
in criminal prosecutions,27 that the customers were necessarily paying for
a chance. And it was to meet such situations that the third and fourth
rationales were devised. In both of them, the concept of a valuable con-
sideration, bargained for by the operator and paid by the participant at least
in part for the chance, was abandoned. They might be called the "contract
consideration" and the "increased revenue" rules.
22. The ordinary time allowed for claiming the prize is two or three minutes. See
Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190 S. C. 282, 2 S. E. (2d) 782 (1939) (10 minutes
allowed; legal); People v. Shafer, 160 Misc. 174, 289 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1935) (5
minutes; legal); State v. Wilson, 109 Vt. 349, 196 At. 757 (1938) (one minute; illegal) ;
Griffith Amusement Co. v. Morgan, 98 S. NV. (2d) 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (winner
notified by telephone; legal).
23. See State ex rel. Cowie v. LaCrosse Theatres Co., 232 Wis. 153, 2S6 N. AV.
707 (1939); Grimes v. State, 178 So. 69 (Ala. Ct. App. 1937) [compare, however, the
decision on appeal, 178 So. 73 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1937)]; Commonwealth v. Lund, 15 A.
(2d) 839 (Pa. 1940) (no free registration, but free prosy cards of the type given to
matinee patrons).
24. Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. State ex iel. Ferguson, 185 So. 862 (Fla. Sup. Ct,
Div. B., 1939) (drawing at some time between 7 P.M. and 10 P.M.); Cole v. State,
133 Tex. Crim. App. 548, 112 S. W. (2d) 725 (1937) (drawing at end of first show).
25. Little River Theatre Corp. v. State ex tel. Hodge, 185 So. 855 (F M. Sup. Ct.
1939) (attendance on Bank Night from two to seven times normal). See also Common-
wealth v. Lund, 15 A. (2d) 839 (Pa. 1940).
26. General Theatres, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp., 9 F. Supp.
546 (D. Colo. 1935) (354,000 chances given to patrons, 180,000 to non-patrons) ; State
v. Jones, 107 P. (2d) 324 (N. Ml. 1940) (great majority of registrants bought tickets).
Still another factor indicating purchases for the sake of participation, is a decline in
the quality of the film shown on Bank Night. Central States Theatre Corp. v. Patz,
11 F. Supp. 566 (S. D. Iowa 1935).
27. Flexible-participation lotteries are most likely to be declared legal in criminal
cases. State v. Big Chief Corp., 13 A. (2d) 236 (R. I. 1940) ; State v. Horn, 16 N. J.
Misc. 319, 1 A. (2d) 51 (1938); see Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190 S. C.
282, 2 S. E. (2d) 782 (1939). The next most lenient type of case, for obvious reasons,
is that in which the prizewinner sues a reneging proprietor for his prize. St. Peter v.
Pioneer Theatre Corp., 227 Iowa 1391, 291 N. W. 164 (1940).
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Maughs v. Porter,28 decided in 1931, is the leading case propounding the
contract consideration theory. Under that doctrine the consideration pro-
ceeding from the participant need not be valuable, but merely sufficient to
support a contract. In the Bank Night scheme the acts of registration and
attendance outside of the theater at the time of the drawing would be bar-
gained-for detriments to the promisee. Since the operator bargains for them
with a reasonable expectation that they will increase his profits (because
many of the outside participants are eventually induced to come in and sit
down), they are not conditions to a gift, but consideration to support the
promise to give a prize to the participant if his number wins.29 And under
the doctrine of the Maughs case, this consideration is sufficient to make the
scheme a lottery.
This rationale raises the whole question of the public policy behind the
lottery statutes, for if they are designed only to prevent the public from
hazarding its money on the chance of a large return, there would seem to
be no reason for calling anything but pecuniary consideration such con-
sideration as makes the scheme of chance a lottery.30 If, on the other hand,
as many judges seem to think, the statutes are designed to prevent other
evils incident to the operation of schemes of chance, such as the general
excitement of the gambling instinct, and the purchase of luxuries that might
not otherwise be bought, the concept of "lottery consideration" will have to
be broadened to include more than the mere passage of money from the par-
ticipants to the operator.31 The consideration requirement, because it is one
tool by which the court declares a scheme illegal as a "lottery," is, depending
upon what it is made to include in each case, a doctrinal expression of each
court's philosophy concerning lotteries in general.
The Maughs case, involving an expansion of the consideration concept,
was at first violently criticized when applied to Bank Night.32 Then, as the
28. 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 242 (1931); (1932) 18 VA. L. REV. 465; (1932) 80 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 744.
29. This is orthodox contract law. 1 WILLISTON, CoNTAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) 379
et seq.; State v. Wilson, 109 Vt. 349, 196 Atl. 757 (1938).
30. City of Roswell v. Jones, 41 N. M. 258, 67 P. (2d) 286 (1937), overruled in
State v. Jones, 107 P. (2d) 324 (N. M. 1940); Griffith Amusement Co. v. Morgan,
98 S. W. (2d) 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); St. Peter v. Pioneer Theatre Corp., 227
Iowa 1391, 291 N. W. 164 (1940) ; State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608
(1936); Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Co., 23 F. Snpp. 3 (N. D. Ill.
1937). See Pickett, supra note 3, at 1205, 1210; INsTITUTE OF MUX. LAW OFF., REP.
No. 22 (Sept. 1937); Comment (1937) 9 Miss. L. J. 495.
31. The courts have complained that the scheme fosters "cupidity, envy, jealousy,
and temptation" [Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N. E. (2d) 648 (1937)],
and that it stimulates the desire to gain profits "by the lucky turn of chance," at the
expense of the "industry and earnings of others," rather than by one's own efforts, as a
reward for skill, accomplishment, or hard work. State v. Dorau, 124 Conn. 160, 198 Atl.
573 (1938) ; State ex rel. Hunter v. Fox Beatrice Theatre Corp., 133 Neb. 392, 275 N.
W. 605 (1937). See Haley, The Broadcasting and Postal Lottcry Statntes (1936) 4
GEO. WASH. L. R1v. 475, 485; (1938) 17 NEB. L. BULL. 94.
32. People v. Shafer, 160 Misc. 174, 289 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1936) ; State ex rel. Dist.
Att'y Gen. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 170 Tenn. 351, 95 S. W. (2d) 310 (1936).
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minor popular hysteria evoked by the scheme, or the annoying interruption
it wrought in the middle of the regular entertainment, or perhaps the decline
in quality of the accompanying film, impressed themselves unfavorably upon
the judicial mind, the criticism became largely confined to cases in which a
winner sued for his prize.33 These are notoriously hard cases, since an appli-
cation of the Mlaughs rule must result in the winner's having either an illegal
contract, or no contract at all. But recent renewal of emphasis upun the
doctrine of contract consideration may herald a general broadening, by its
use, of the lottery consideration requirement.34
Under the fourth rationale the increased revenues received by a merchant
or theater-owner after operation of a scheme of chance is begun are in them-
selves such consideration as to constitute it a lottery. The idea that the
consideration must be viewed only from the standpoint of the participants
is abandoned in favor of a new theory looking to benefits received by the
operator. Logically, the theory can be attacked on the ground that the desire
for increased revenues is merely a motive which induces the operator to
bargain for registration and attendance at the drawing. On the other hand,
the scheme must be viewed as a whole, and not as a series of separate con-
tracts, if its true effect is to be discovered3r The doctrine of increased revenue,
although perhaps the most recent rationale to appear as a principal ground
of decision, has proved to be the most popular.30 Because no scheme would
be operated unless it were profitable, this theory of indirect benefits seems
to embody the doctrinal answer to almost any scheme offensive to the spirit
of the statutes. The possibilities of expansion of the lottery consideration
concept along these lines, to include even such remote benefits as advertising,
would seem to be almost unlimited.
Two cases, decided last year, mark a further step in the judicial campaign
against flexible-participation lotteries, and indicate the usefulness of the new
concepts forged largely during the Bank Night period. In both State ex rel.
33. Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corporation, 162 Misc. 491, 293 N. Y. Supp.
745 (1937); Dorman v. Publix-Saenger-Sparks Theatres, 184 So. 836 (Fla. Sup. Ct.,
Div. A., 1938); St. Peter v. Pioneer Theatre Corp., 227 Iowa 1391, 291 N. W. 164
(1940); Corio v. Laurelton Amusement Co., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 13, 1937, p. 764, col. 2
(Sup. Ct., App. Term), (1937) 37 Cor.. L. Rnv. 877.
34. See State ex rel. Regez v. Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 294 N. W. 491 (1940); Affil-
iated Enterprises, Inc. v. Waller, 5 A. (2d) 257 (Super. Ct. Dela. 1939); State v. Wil-
son, 109 Vt. 349, 196 Atl. 757 (1938); State v. Jones, 107 P. (2d) 324 (N. M. 1940)
semble.
35. Commonwealth v. Lund, 15 A. (2d) 839 (Pa. 1940).
36. The theory was rejected in the earlier flexible-participation cases. Yellow-Stone
Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338 (1890). It seems to have originated in State v. Bader,
21-0. L. Rep. 293 (Ohio 1922), or State v. Danz, 140 Wash. 546, 250 Pac. 37 (1926), as
an alternative holding to the "subterfuge!' theory, and was rejected in the earlier Bank
Night cases. State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608 (1936). In the Bank
Night cases, it appeas first as an alternative holding in State ex ret. Beck v. Fox Kansas
Theatre Co., 144 Kan. 687, 62 P. (2d) 929 (1936), and as a principal holding in United-
Detroit Theatres Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise, Inc., 280 Mich. 425, 273 X. W.
756 (1937).
1941]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Dussault v. Fox Missoula Theatre Corp.8 7 and State ex rel. Regez v. Blumcr,08
the lotteries were operated so that the non-paying participants did not have
to be present at the drawing, a fact obliterating any difference between "paid"
and "free" chances. Neither customers nor theater-goers could be said to
have paid for their chances, yet both schemes, probably legal a few years
ago, were declared lotteries through the use of the third and fourth rationales
here described.
A fifth method of disposing of schemes of chance, appearing relatively
recently, involves the judicial construction of statutes which prohibit "schemes
of chance" 39 or "gift enterprises ' 40 as well as "lotteries." These terms, and,
others, 41 have not yet been given the legal content of the word "lottery," and
there are indications that in such instances the consideration requirement may
be much weakened or abolished. As yet the decisions are sparse, but they
may point the way toward the complete disappearance of consideration as
a requirement for illegal schemes of chance in more than one jurisdiction.
In the last analysis, the use of any lottery law to regulate Bank Night is
an anachronism. All of these statutes were enacted to prohibit an immoral
kind of activity; as employed in the Bank Night cases, they are often simply
an instrument for the regulation of business competition among theater oper-
ators.4 There seems no need, however, for clarifying legislation in this
field; the liberal constructions developed by the judiciary have to date effected
a satisfactory administration of the present dual function of the lottery statute.
37. 101 P. (2d) 1065 (Mont. 1940). It was possible for persons to avoid attendance
outside of the theatre merely by writing their names and addresses on cards available at
the theatres.
38. 236 Wis. 129, 294 N. W. 491 .(1940). A druggist gave out coupons daily to all
who entered his store, whether or not they bought merchandise. Each day, a drawing
was held from a list of free registrants, and the winner sought out at his address, or
wherever he could be found. If he could not produce a coupon given out on the previous
day the prize went back into the pool. Cf. State ex rel. Cowie v. LaCrosse Theatres
Co., 232 Wis. 153, 286 N. W. 707 (1939).
39. Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 64 Ohio App. 105, 28 N. E. (2d) 207
(1940).
40. See State ex ret. Dussault v. Fox Missoula Theatre Corp., 101 P. (2d) 1065,
1070-71 (Mont. 1940); City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 129 Tex. 40, 100 S. W.
(2d) 695 (1936).
41. State v. Dorau, 124 Conn. 160, 198 Atl. 573 (1938) ("hazard"). But see State
v. Big Chief Corp., 13 A. (2d) 236 (R. I. 1940) (liberal statute more or less ignored).
42. It is quite probable that a majority of the criminal cases involving Bank Night
were the result of pressure applied by disgruntled competitors. And many of the civil
actions were actually instituted by exhibitors seeking an injunction on grounds of unfair
competition. United-Detroit Theatres Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise, 280 Mich.
425, 273 N. W. 756 (1937); Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enter-
prise, 276 Mich. 127, 267 N. W. 602 (1936). See General Theatres, Inc., v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp., 9-F. Supp. 546 (D. Colo. 1935) (violation of NRA
Code).
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